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The cross petitions in this class action case 
ask the Court to decide when a discriminatory hiring practice 
C"FR w,rL. ~Y" t,:) ~s~~ .. t .'~ r;l-l($1 .. TAe IS<>«t7J ar-pt<JJuth~(' 
rftt IY't1.(.(s- til a"'" e.JU.rlo7fiA.~"'T diJ(..t/!fAr/1.4.,/0"(1 Su..;r I'U.«'i,. st.o~ dtsatMrfltt1eJ1) 
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ceases for purposes of Title VII, whether a timely claim of one 
or more class members resurrects other members' claims, and 
I whether Title VI and §1981 prohibit conduct having discriminatory impact absent proof of discriminatory intent. 
2. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Between 1968 and 1970 New 
York City administered eight written examinations to Police 
Department applicants. Each exam resulted in a list of eligible 
./{ '( 
candidates ranked according to their test scores, and New York 
law requires that candidates be hired according to the order on 
the list. A hiring freeze was imposed on the NYPD from May 1970 
to January 1973. While some appointments were made prior to the 
freeze, the bulk of the appointments from the lists were made 
after January 1973. Another hiring freeze was imposed in October 
1974. On June 30, 1975, the Police Department was required to 
lay off approximately 2,800 officers for budgetary reasons. The 
ll layoff~ were made pursuant to the Department's "last hired, first 
.. 
-fired" policy. 
In March 1972 black and Hispanic candidates brought suit 
alleging that the written~ams administered between 1968 and 
/ 
1970 were discriminatory, causing blacks and Hispanics to score 
lower than they otherwise would, thus causing them to hold lower 
positions on the eligible lists, which delayed their appointments 
(Guardians I). The DC denied a preliminary injunction which 
would have suspended hiring from the lists and the CA 2 affirmed 
on the grounds that the lists were nearly exhausted. Plaintiffs 
abandoned the action • 
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The plaintiffs in this suit filed charges with the EEOC in 
1975, and in 1976 brought suit on behalf of all black and 
Hispanic officers laid off on June 30, 1975 (Guardians II). They 
claimed that but for the discriminatory exams in 1968-70, they 
would have been appointed earlier and would have es~ished 
sufficient seniority to withstand the layoffs. The DC granted a 
preliminary injunction requiring the reordering of NYPD seniority 
lists to accord plaintiffs constructive seniority. The DC 
specifically held that the exams and the layoffs were not 
intentionally discriminatory. 
The CA 2 vacated the injunction and remanded for 
consideration in light of International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977) (neutral seniority system 
which perpetuates past discrimination cannot be challenged under 
Title VII). On remand the plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
assert a claim under making their claims identical to 
~----~~------------------
the ones asserted in 1972 in Guardians I. The DC (Carter) again 
granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, 
concluding that relief could be granted under Title VII to those 
class members hired after 1972, when Title VII was amended to 
include municipalities. The court further determined that Title 
VI, which forbids discrimination by recipients of federal funds, 
Jfmpliedly confers a ri on private individuals and 
bans conduct which has a discriminatory impact. Since Title VI 
/
has been applicable to municipalities since 1964, the DC found 
all black and Hispanic police officers who took the challenged 
exams to be entitled to an award of constructive seniority. 
.· -4-
3. OPINION BELOW: The ~ 2 reversed in a lengthY opinion. 
~ 
Writing for the court, Judge Meskill upheld the DC finding that ~ ...:--- ,. 
the t~~ a disproportionate impact on class members. He 
next found that the results of the tests were being used to 
discriminate, in violation of Title VII, each time a member of 
the plaintiff class was denied a chance to fill a vacancy in the 
Police Department. Thus the Department's actions were not merely 
effects of earlier discriminatory conduct. The discrimination 
began before Title VII was made applicable to municipalities in 
1972, but it continued until 1974 when the defendants ceased 
hiring based upon the lists. The court held that plaintiffs 
demonstrated a continuing violation of Title VII as to which a 
timely EEOC charge was filed. Where a continuing, illegal ,_____ 
employment policy is maintained, relief for injuries sustained 
prior to the beginning of the 300-day limitations period is --
appropriate. Thus the DC properly declined to limit relief to 
the plaintiffs who were wrongfully refused employment within 300 
days preceding the filing of the EEOC charge, since the NYPD's 
actions were not discrete acts but were part of a consistent 
policy. 
Th~ 2 unanimously reversed the awarding of relief under --Title VI. Judge Meskill found that there was no private right of 
action under Title VI. Writing for the court on the Title VI 
issue, Judge Coffrin, joined by Judge Kelleher, reversed the DC 
on the ground that ~tle VI requires proof of discrimi~ 
intent. In Regents of the University of California v.~ 438 
u.s. 265 (1978), Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
-5-
Blackmun took the position that Title VI imposes an intent 
standard. Thus the majority of the Court overruled Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 u.s. 563 (1974), which holds that Title VI requires 
only proof of discriminatory impact. Relying on Washington v. I 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the CA 2 rejected plaintiffs' §1981 
claim on the ground that the statute prohibits only purposeful 
racial discrimination. 
4. CONTENTIONS: 
A. Plaintiffs seek review of the CA 2's determination 
that they must prove discriminatory intent as a prerequisite to 
relief under Title VI and §1981. They contend that the ~ourt 
squarely and unanimously held in Lau v. Nichols that a showing of 
discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish a violation 
under Title VI. The CA 2 reached the opposite result by relying 
upon dicta in Bakke. In Bakke, the challenged preference was 
intentional, and the question of whether Title VI covers 
practices with a discriminatory impact was not before the Court. 
Instead, the question was what justification could legitimize a 
racial classification. It would be consistent with congressional 
intent to interpret Title VI as prohibiting acts that have the 
effect of discrimination yet permitting racial preferences 
designed to remedy past discrimination. Thus Bakke did not 
overrule Lau v. Nichols, a conclusion which is supported by the 
Court's reliance on Lau in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 
479-80 (1980). While the~A 2, ~ 5, and~ 7 have concluded 
that discriminatory intent must be shown to establish a violation 
of Title VII, the CA 3, sitting en bane, has recently reached the 
-6-
opposite conclusion. NAACP v. The Medical Center, Inc., (June 
29, 1981) . 1 Panels of the CA 9 have also followed Lau after 
Bakke, although those opinions did not analyze the impact of 
Bakke. The decision below is inconsistent with the 
interpretations given to other provisions of the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1964 and 1968 and it conflicts with the regulations 
promulgated by federal agencies which must enforce Title VI. 
Discussion: There is a direct conflict between the CA 2 
and the CA 3 on this issue. Given the importance of the issue, 
and the confusion as to whether Bakke overruled Lau sub silencio, 
I would recommend CFR with a view to granting on this issue. 
B. Plaintiffs next point out that the issue of whether 
intentional discriminatjon must be proven under §1981 has never --
been addressed by this Court. In Washington v. Davis the Court 
held that discriminatory intent must be established to show an 
equal protection violation, but §1981 was not addressed. This 
Court subsequently granted cert in County of Los Angeles v. 
Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), to consider "whether the use of 
arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusive in operation, 
but not purposely discriminatory, violates 42 u.s.c. §1981," but 
the case was vacated and remanded as moot. Most courts have 
required plaintiffs to prove intent to establish a violation of 
§1981, but the issue of what is the proper standard remains 
unresolved. 
1Neither party has sought cert or an extension of time in 
which to file for cert. 
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Discussion: The CA 2 noted that guidance regarding the 
correct interpretation of §1981 has been eagerly awaited ever 
since Washington v. Davis. That cert was granted in County of 
Los Angeles v. Davis indicates the importance of the issue. 
However, the conflict in the circuits which existed when cert was 
granted in County of Los Angeles v. Davis is no longer present. 
See Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 {9th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 {Feb. 24, 1981) {overruling County 
of Los Angeles v. Davis). On the other hand, if the Court grants 
cert on the Title VI issue, there is no reason not to dispell any 
remaining doubt as to the proper standard under §1981. Thus I 
recommend CFR with a view to granting on this issue as well. 
-----c. Defendants also seek cert on two issues. They first 
argue that the act of discrimination in a Title VII case must be 
precisely identified for statute of limitation purposes. The CA 
2 characterized plaintiffs' claim as a discriminatory refusal to 
hire which continued until 1974, but the acts forming the basis 
of the claim were the giving of the exams and the promulgation of 
the rank-ordered eligibility lists. Under New York state law, 
the claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run 
upon promulgation of the eligibility list. Plaintiffs' claim is 
not a continuing violation of Title VII, and the continuing 
impact of a past discriminatory act does not~ se constitute a 
continuing violation of Title VII. ~elaware State College v. 
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 {1980). The Court held in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States that the application of 
a neutral seniority system does not violate Title VII even if it 
-8-
perpetuates pre-Act discrimination, and bona fide merit systems 
are afforded the same protection. Frank v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). New York state law mandating rank-
ordered appointments is clearly a neutral merit system. 
Plaintiffs' claims do not satisfy any of the traditional criteria 
for establishing a continuing violation, and the claims are 
identical to those in United Airlines v. Evans, where the Court 
held that the seniority system was neutral in its operation. 
Plaintiffs' response tracks the CA 2 opinion. The 
contention that the operative event for Title VII purposes is the 
promulgation of eligibility lists conflicts with the express 
language of the statute, which provides that it is not unlawful 
for an employer "to act upon the results of any professionally 
developed ability test, provided that .•. action upon the 
results is not • used to discriminate •.•• " 42 u.s.c. 
§2000e-II(h). The statute clearly focuses on the use of 
examinations. Defendants' reliance on New York cases holding 
that a claim arises upon promulgation of eligibility lists is 
misplaced. Those cases concerned suits under New York law and 
are not relevant to a suit based upon Title VII. It is well-
settled that an employer violates Title VII so long as it 
continues to deny jobs based on a discriminatory hiring policy. 
TheCA 2's decision was not inconsistent with United Airlines v. 
Evans and Delaware State College v. Ricks, which hold that a 
Title VII claim may not be predicated solely upon the continuing 
impact within the limitations period of a violation which pre-
dates the limitation period. The court's decision is premised 
' .. 
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not on the continued impact of pre-Act discrimination, but on 
actual post-Act refusals to hire. Moreover, as the CA 2 
concluded, a hiring system that ranks applicants according to 
their scores on a discriminatory examination cannot claim the 
status of a bona fide merit system within the meaning of the 
statute. 
Discussion: Plaintiffs have the better of the argument 
on this issue. The CA 2 correctly distinguished this case from 
Evans, Ricks, and Teamsters in deciding that post-Act refusals to 
hire pursuant to pre-Act discriminatory exams violates Title VII. 
I recommend denial in light of defendants' failure to cite any 
conflicts in the circuits. 
D. Defendants take issue with theCA 2's holding that 
all class members hired after 1972 were entitled to relief and 
its refusal to limit relief only to class members who were 
refused hire within 300 days prior to the filing of EEOC charges. 
They claim that the court erroneously relied upon Acha v. Beame, 
570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978). 
Plaintiffs argue that a purported misinterpretation by 
one panel of a circuit of a prior decision by the same circuit 
does not warrant cert. The denial of the petition for rehearing 
with suggestion for rehearing en bane suggests that the rest of 
the circuit concurs with the panel opinion. Moreover, there is 
ample support for the CA 2's position that relief is appropriate 
for injuries sustained prior to the limitations period where the 
defendant engaged in a consistent discriminatory policy. 
-10-
Discussion: Defendants cite no cases suggesting that 
the CA 2 was incorrect. I recommend denial. 
5. CONCLUSION: I recommend CFR in No. 81-431. While I do 
not think No. 81-432 presents any certworthy issues, it might be 
appropriate to hold it for consideration along with No. 81-431 
rather than to dismiss it at this time. 
There is a response to No. 81-432, but there is no 
response to No. 81-431. 
October 21, 1981 
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I 
Motion of Parties to Dispense 
with Printing the Joint 
Appe ndix 
SU~...ARY: Petrs and resps jointly move to dispense with print-
ing an appendix. They intend to rely only on the opinions of the 
courts below which have been included in the cert petns for both this 
case and 81-432. Cert was granted on January 11, 1982 and 81-432 is 
being held for this case. 
DISCUSSION: The issues presented in this case c e nter on applica-
tion of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C 
§1981 in a c·lass action suit brought by minority police man. Presum-
ably, any facts p e rtinent to this litigation are addre ssed in the 
opinions below or are not being contested by the parties. On that 
basis, the motion may be granted. 
There is no r es ponse. 
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uardians Association v. C.:!.Y.:_il_§_ervict? __ (:;!omm1ssion. 
__ :(_the- City ·of New. Yor~ 
I have read preliminarily the principal briefs in this 
important case. Rather than "scribble" on the covers as a 
means of refreshing my recollection, I dictate this sketchy 
memorandum. 
This is a .._ =!sfiJetwrsen a class of black and Hispanic 
police officers appointed to positions in New York City on the 
basis of 1968-70 Civil Service examinations. This litigation 
commenced in 1976, and has been to the Court of Appeals three 
times. It was a Title VII initially , but in its present 
posture it is a suit under Title VI enacted in 1964. The 
present members of the class have no rights under Title VII 
because it was not made applicable to municipal governments 
until 1972, after the discrimination found in the 1968-70 
examinations. 
Prior decisions, not challenged here, held that these 
examinations were unot job related" , and therefore "had a 
discriminatory impact on the scores of blacks and Hispanics". 
Although members of the class made passing scores, entrance 
into the system - i.e. appointment - was made in the order of 
test scores. Thus, seniority and related benefits were affected 
adversely by the low scores made by petitioners. 
Although discriminatory ~meact was found, CA 2 held that 
both Title VI and § 1981 requfre i?roof of discriminatory intent, 
and it is conceded that no such intent was proved in this case. 
Thus, the issue presented in this case on the basis of 
questions on whtcn'"certiorari were granted is whether discrimina--
tory intent is a prerequisite to injunctive and damages relief 
in a Title VI suit? s rong briefs-both~for PetitfOners and 
respondents have beenf iled. One o\ the Wall Street firms 
represents ' . , the co~g~~ntmDB counsel of New York 
is Frederick Swartz, Jr., the well educated son of one of the 




,.J ~ -~.v2~ I~ 
/' J ~ .I.At". ~-.0 ~ 19 ~ ~ 
/~~~~~A 
The debate centers prima ly on three decisions o1? t his ~~ 
Court. Petitioners rely on u v. Nichols, 414 u.s. 563 in ~~.~~~ 
which this Court, unanimous~ , statea-that Title VI did not {fJ~I 
require discriminatory inten • Respondents rely, with equal . . 
confidence, on views express d by five of us (in Brennan's and~
my opinions) in Bakke, and s bsequently by a majority of the  
Court in Board of Education • Harris, 444 u.s. 130. In both ,~ 
Bakke and- Harris, this Cour statedthat Title VI incorporate vI 
the constitutional intent andard as set forth in W~shiggton~,,~, 
Davis. /~,., 
. The parties also whether § 1981 embodies an impactM~ 
standard or requires a show ng of discriminatory intent. 6f 
etitioners argue that we h ve never de cided this question 
(. 
which I believe is correc, so far as a Court opinion goes), 
~ while respondents :3a~t § 1981 has its roots in the 
•• 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, that at the time these 
were adopted no one had ever heard of an " impact standard" • 
one not articulated until 100 years later. Moreover, 
respondents argue that § 1981 must be construed to accord 
with our construction of §§ .! 1982, 1983 and 1985, each of which 
requirffiproof of discriminatory intent. 
I have been of the opinion - and expressed it in one or 
more cases (see a case here from the city of Los Angeles three 
or four years ago) - that § 1981 does require a discriminatory 
intent (at least this is my recollection , without checking back). 
As stated in Bakke, it also has been my view that Title VI 
embodied the constitutional intent standard of Wash~~~~~~ 
Davis and ~lington Heights. I do not recall, when working on 
Bakke, that I considered expressly what the Court s aid in 
Lau. I am dictating this in my residence, and probably 
will not do any legal research myself at this time, nor do I 
recall whether the Court's decision in Lau required a finding 
that proof of intent was unnecessary. That is, did we hold 
that only disparate impact is necessary in a Title VI case? 
Both parties rely on legislative history. My impression 
from the briefs is that CA 2 and respondents have the better of 
this argument. Petitioners, r mqever, do have support in the 
Regulations adopted by the Department of Labor • 
No. 81431 3. 
My intuitive tentative view is that CA 2 decided the 
case correctly and should be affirmed. This view is 
based, in large part, on the following considerations: 
(i) Congress was not _e~plicit on this issue and 
I am reluctant to infer a wider type of 
liability on municipalities and employe r ,s 
than Congress made clear it wished to impose. 
(ii) kind that 
ersons are involved 
~~~~~--~~~~~~~~ 
(See my dissent ~n Bowman). Here, petitioners 
are blacks and Hispanics who have less seniority 
in their jobs because of Civil Service tests 
that were not job related. But if petitioners ', · 
win, police officers who scored higher grades on 
Civil Service examinationsfoill forfeit 
seniority position - including rank with 
respect to lay-offs and other critical employ& 
ment issues. Thus, the Civil Service Commission -
in this important sense - is not the real party 
in interest on the respondents' side. 
(iii) Finally, in Bakke and Harris, both decided since 
Lau, a majority of the~ustices would have held 
that Title VI a lies the constitutional s andard 
of disC:riminatory intent. ince t ese two cases 
were c~ded, istrict courts and courts of ] 
appeals almost uniformly have read Bakke and 
~arris this way. We would look more than a 
little silly if, at this time, the Court 
reverted back to language in Lau. 
Nevertheless, I would like for my clerk to address particu-
larly these three cases, including the question whether Lau 
would have to be overruled if we follow the more recent state-
ments of the Court. 
* * * 
There is a threshold issue mentioned only briefly in 
respondents' brief: whether a private remedy for ~njunctive 
relief and for damages may be inferred from Title VI . Judge 
Meskill, in his separate opinion, ~~the district court, 
~ .... 
No. 81431 4. 
both discussed this issue, but it is not expressly included 
in the questions of our grant. I am inclmned to think, 
however, that the question necessarily is subsumed in the 
questions now before the Court. Unless there is a private 
remedy, we do not reach the issue debated by the parties. 
For reasons I have stated - · at perhaps too great a length 
in other oases commencing with my dissent in Cannon - I 
am less than enthusiastic about implying private-causes of 
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lief under Title VI? ' . . ,-~ 
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2. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
u.s.c. §2000d, provides: "No person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal ---------financial assistance." 
B. Facts 
Between 1968 and 1970 the New York City Department of Person-
nel administered several civil service exams for the position of 
police officer. Candidates who passed a test were rank-ordered 
on an eligibility list on the basis of their test scores. New 
~-------
officers were hired from the top of the list. Following a hiring 
freeze between 1970 and 1973, the city hired new officers and 
exhausted the lists. In June 1975 the Police Department (NYPD) ) ~­
laid off ~0 o~cers, of whom 21.5% were minorities, on a last- ~ 
hired, first-fired basis. 





In April 1976 petitioners, who represent minority police of-
ficers, brought this lawsuit alleging that but for the examina-
tions given between 1968 and 1970, they would have been appointed 
earlier and accrued sufficient seniority to avoid the layoffs. 
/ ' 3. f) 
The DC (SONY, Carter) found that the test was not job-related ~-
and had a discriminatory impact on minority candidates. Accord-~ 
ingly, use of the eligibility lists was unlawful after March 24, ~ 
~Ia(_ 
1972, the date Title VII was applied to state and local govern- -~ 
v 
ments. The DC further ruled that use of the tests and lists pri-~ 
~------------
or to March 1972 violated Title VI. The court held that Title VI~~ 
. . 1 . d . · h f · f d d · I '17 2-, contains an Imp Ie private rig t o action or amages an In-~
junctive relief and that Title VI does not require petitioners to ~· 
prove intentional discrimination. Claims under 42 u.s.c. §§19~J  
and 1983 were rejected, however, because petitioners had not nz.._f ____ · 
established intentional discrimination. 466 F. Supp. 1273 ~ 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), Joint Appendix (J.A.) Al08. ~ 
The VCA2 affirmed on the Title VII, §1981, and §1983 issues,~ 
r 
but reversed on the Title VI issue. 633 F.2d 232 (CA2 1980) ,~ 
.4:> /f7'2--
J.A. Al. Visiting Judge Coffrin (D. Vt.), joined by visiting 
Judge Kelleher (~. Cal.), held that Title VI requires proof of 
inte tional discrimination. J.A. A88-A94. Judge Meskill did not 
~ 
issue, finding instead that Title VI does not contain ~ ~ 
implied right of action for damages. J.A. A46-A65. ~ 
This Court granted ~~rt to d~cide whether proof of intention~ 
al discrimination is required under Title VI and §1981 • 
. ;' 
Amici briefs in support of petitioners have been filed by the 
NAACP; the ACLU; and the Asian American Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund. The Equal Employment Advisory Council has filed an amicus 
brief in support of respondents. 
. ..... .. 
·' . '' 
4. 
II. Discussion 
A. The Private Right of Action Issue v~~ 
V Cer t was not ranted on this issue./ Only respondents raise 
it in the briefs. See Brief for Respondents at 8-9. None the-
less, this Court should decide the issue. If there is no private 
right of action, the basis for the suit disappears. Moreover, 
~ 
although most circuits have held that Title VI creates a private 
right of action, this view is not unanimous. For example, the 
CAS has held that even assuming that an action may be brought for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, an issue the court did not 
decide, "this private right of action allowed under Title VI en-
compasses no more than an attempt to have any discriminatory ac-
tivity ceased. It does not include the right to recover backpay 
or other losses " Drayden v. Needville Independent School 
Dist., 642 F.2d 129,133 (CAS 1981). Accord, Concerned Tenants 
Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v. Indian Trails Apartments, 
496 F. Supp. S22, S27 (N.D. Ill. 1980). And one district court 
has held that no private right of action exists under Title VI. 
Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. 
Va. 1979). 
~ It is true that respondents, for unknown reasons, neither 
~~pealed the issue to the CA2 nor requested that it be decided in 
~ -r>his court. But sint;?~oc · and the CA2 deCided the issue, the 
~ f:YV prudential case for avoiding it is weak. Cf. University of Cali-
C fJ' ~. 0 fornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 26S, 283 (1978) (opinion of 




sue because it was neither argued nor decided below). According-
ly, I will discuss the merits of the right of action dispute. 
1. Views of Supreme Court Justices in Bakke 
Four current Justices went on record on this issue in Bakke. 
/ 
{a) The Stevens Opinion ( },. -~ .. ~ 7;,_ ~IJ ~ lA...f-3 ~ ~ 9: ttl w 1-Hf ,~------ 4?'~) 
Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Just1ces 
Stewart and Rehnquist, rejected the University of California's 
"belated" argument that Bakke could not enforce Title VI in a 
private action. Justice Stevens found that "the question is not 
properly before us," but went on to reject the claim. He cited 
lower court decisions; the agreement of the United States that a 
private action exists; subsequent legislation predicated on the 
assumption that a private action exists; and the general tenor of 
the legislative history. See 438 u.s. at 419-21. 
{b) ·The White Opinion r~ ~~~) 
Justice White's separate opinion in Bakke argued that Title 
VI q,oes not contain a private right of action. He emphasized 
that Titles II and VII specifically created private rights of 
action, whereas Title VI was silent; that implying a private 
right of action would be inconsistent with Congress' provision 
for extensive administrative review prior to funding termination; 
---------~-----~'------------------
and that key legislators stated that no private right of action 
existed. See 438 u.s. at 379-87. 
{c) The Powell and Brennan Opinions 
In Bakke you declined to decide 
J ~M.f~~ 
~"~\! 
the issue, but observed: 





any intent to create a private right of action." 438 u.s. at 283 
n.l8. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun expressed no views. 
2. Cannon v. University of Chicago 
In Cannon, 441 u.s. 677 (1979), this Court decided that Title 
establishes a private right of action. Justice Stevens' rna-
jority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
and Rehnquist, relied heavily on the fact that Title IX was mod-
eled after Title VI, which at the time Title IX was enacted had 
been interpreted by lower courts as creating a private cause of 
action. See 441 u.s. at 694-703. 
Justice VWhi te, joined by Justice Blackmun, reiterated his 
view that a private right of action should not be implied 
Title VI. Id. at 718-30. Your dissenting opinion agreed 
with Justice White's analysis. Id. at 730. 
3. Discussion 
~~tendThteo reasoning of the Cannon opinions almost surely will ex-
~-ten this case. The majority op~nion all but expressly rati-
1/Y fied the lower court opinions implying a private right of action 
under Title VI. In contrast, under your dissent and Justice 
White's dissent no private right of action should be implied. In 
view of these set positions, I will not discuss the legislative 
history or the pro/con arguments. Rather I will confine my anal-
~~~ ysis to an issue not previously discussed by members of this 
~~ourt: Judge Meskill's suggestion that Title VI may contain an 
implied right of action for 
not for damages. 
Judge Meskill wrote that Title VI does not create a private -
action for damages; he expressed no view on the existence of an 
for nonmonetary relief. (As noted at p. 4 supra, the CAS 
He could find no prior case in which compen-
damages had been awarded under Title VI. All of the 
that had implied an action under Title VI had done so only --
with regard to declaratory or injunctive relief. J.A. A49-A52. 
,, 
Judge Meskill then argued that a damage remedy was incon- I 
sistent with Title VI's express remedy of funding termination :, ~ 
He noted that even suits limited to declaratory and injunctive 
relief could circumvent Title VI's administrative process and, 
significantly, its emphasis on conciliation and voluntary compli-
ance. But a damage remedy potentially was far worse: "[T]he 
present case illustrates that awards of compensatory and retro-
spective relief in such actions might have consequences far more ------
crippling to the recipients of federal funds than termination." 
J.A. A63 n.56. Faced with the prospect of heavy damage remedies, 
recipients would be more likely to refuse federal funds rather 
than comply voluntarily with an agency's suggestions. 
I agree with Judge Meskill that a damage remedy is inconsis-l tent with Title VI's express remedy, but I think the argument 
shows that no private right of action should be implied under 
Title VI. The legislative history does not support the view that 
a private right of action exists for the limited purpose of 
. ' . . 
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declaratory and injunctive relief, but not for damages. 2 Judge 
Meskill's reliance on Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 u.s. 11 (1979), is misplaced. Transamerica held that 
since the Investment Advisors Act declared certain contracts 
void, Congress must have intended to permit some opportunity for 
litigation of voidness issues. But Title VI created an adminis-
trative mechanism for terminating federal funding, see 42 u.s.c. 
§2000d-l, and made these administrative decisions subject to ju-
dicial review, see id. §2000d-2. The Transamerica rationale for 
implying a limited right of action does not apply. 
4. Should Briefing and Argument be Requested? 
~~ Extrapolating from Bakke and Cannon, this Court is split 3-3 
V' on the right of action issue, with three Justices undecided . 
• 
and argument seem warranted. There is no justification for 
another decision simply to presume the existence of a right 
2Judge Meskill also criticized the DC for failing to find 
the amount of funds received by the NYPD and to consider whether 
a damage remedy might be limited to that amount. J.A. A63 n.56. 
The DC stated that Title VI applied because the NYPD accepted 
funds from the Departments of Labor, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Justice to pay officers' and trainees' salaries 
and to finance recruitment. Funds under the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act also were used to pay officers' 
salaries. The court did not state the amount of funding 
received. J.A. Al23. 
Just as I find no support in the legislative history for 
limiting a private right of action to noncompensatory relief, I 
find no support for the alternate suggestion that Title VI may 
contain an implied right of action for damages limited to the 
amount of federal funds received. 
-
9. 
of action. And the Court should not resolve the issue solely on 
the basis of the arguments set forth by lower courts or individ-
ual Justices. 
f 
~ -t!JM.'~f ··tu~-. 
L( U 
B. Standard of Proof in Title VI Actions /3~<1-~-
This issue turns on the conflict between Lau v. Nichols, 414 
U.S. 563 (1974), and the subsequent decisions in Bakke, Board of 
Education v. Harris, 444 u.s. 130 (1980), and Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 u.s. 448 (1980). The CA2 majority relied on Bakke, see 
J.A. A92-A93, while the DC followed Lau, see J.A. Al31-132. 
1. Lau 
In Lau the Court unanimously held that the San Francisco 
school system violated Title VI and the implementing Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regulations by failing to 
provide adequate instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who 
did not speak the English language. 
(a) The Douglas Majority Opinion 
The key passage of Justice Douglas' brief opinion for the 
Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Rehn-
quist, relied on HEW regulations: 
r imination is barred which has that 
ven though no purposeful design is 
pre a recipient "may not . . utilize 
criteria or methods of administration which 
have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination" or have "the effect of defeat-
ing or substantially impairing accomplishment 
of the objectives of the program as respect 
individuals of a particular race, color, or 
national origin." Id., §80.3(b)(2). (414 
u.s. at 568 (emphasis-rn original).) 
10. 
Justice Douglas also relied on HEW "clarifying guidelines" that 
required school districts to take "affirmative steps to rectify 
the language deficiency in order to open its instructional pro-
gram to these students." 414 u.s. at 568 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 
11595 (1970)). Finally, he noted that the school district was 
bound by contractual agreement to comply with Title VI and HEW 
regulations. Id. at 569. 
(b) The Stewart Concurring Opinion 
Justice Stewart, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Blackmun, concurred separately. He noted that plaintiffs had not 
alleged intentional discrimination, but only that respondents 
"have failed to act in the face of changing social and linguistic 
patterns." Id. at 570. This "laissez-faire attitude," he stat-
ed, may not be illegal under Title VI standing alone. But the 
HEW guidelines requiring affirmative efforts are entitled to 
great weight, and must be followed because they are reasonably 
related to the purposes of the legislation. Id. at 570-71. 
2. Bakke ( J'L-f&_, ff ~~~II/~~ 
Five Justices in Bakke stated that Title VI was coextensive 
with the 14th Amendment. 
(a) The Powell Opinion { ~ 
Your opinion noted that "supporters of Title VI repeatedly 
declared that the bill enacted constitutional provisions." 438 
u.s. at 285. You concluded: "In view of the clear legislative 
intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial --classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or 
' .. 
~ ,. .... 
' '- . 
' •. 
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the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 287. Lau was not discussed in that 
section of the opinion. 
(b) The Brennan Opinion 
Justice Brennan's extensive analysis of the legislative his- bV ~ 
tory of Title VI concluded unequivocally that the Title VI stan- f 
dard was meant to replicate the 14th Amendment standard. His 
-------------~--------------opinion was replete with statements such as "Title VI's defini-
J I ' \ 
tion of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the 
Constitution's." Id. at 352. See also id. at 327, 328, 329, 
332. He also addressed the conflict with Lau: 
We recognize that Lau, especially when 
read in light of our subsequent decision in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976), 
which rejected the general proposition that 
governmental action is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate 
impact, may be read as being predicated upon 
the view that, at least under some circum-
stances, Title VI proscribes conduct which 
might not be prohibited by the Constitution. 
Since we are now of the opinion, for the rea-
sons set forth above, that Title VI's stan-
dard, applicable alike to public and private 
recipients of federal funds, is no broader 
than the Constitution's, we have serious 
doubts con rn1ng t e correctness of what ap-
pears to be the premise of that decision. 
(Id. at 352.) 
Justice Brennan went on to note that even if Lau were correct, 
Bakke would not prevail. 
( ';;;~ _1- "' J -1) (c) The Stevens Dissent ~r.--1.> ~ 
Justice Steven's dissent in Bakke argued that Title VI estab-
lishes a colorblind standard. He cited Lau for the proposition 
that Congress may prohibit more conduct than does the Equal Pro-
' . 
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tection Clause, but did not discuss the intent/effects issue. 
Id. at 417 n.20. 
3. Harris 
This decision upheld HEW's denial of Emergency School Aid Act 
(ESAA) funds to the New York City Board of Education because of 
racial disparities in teacher assignments. 
(a) The Blackmun Majority Opinion 
Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, rejected the Board's and 
the dissent's argument that the ESAA should be interpreted along 
with Title VI to require proof of intentional discrimination. In 
discussing why "Congress might impose a stricter standard under 
ESAA than under Title VI," Justice Blackmun argued: "A violation 
of Title VI may result in a cutoff of all federal funds, and it 
is likely that Congress would wish this drastic result only when 
the discrimination is intentional." 444 u.s. at 150. 
(b) The Stewart Dissent 
/ 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, 
stated without qualification that it "follows from Bakke that 
Title VI prohibits only purposeful discrimination." Id. at 160. 
This added Justice Rehnquist to the five other Justices who have 
----------~---------------------------stated that Title VI incorporates the 14th Amendment standard. 
4. Fullilove 
(a) The Burger Plurality Opinion 
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion, joined by Justices 
White and Powell, compared the "minority business enterprise" 
13. 
' 
program to the regulation upheld in Lau, noting specifically that 
the Lau regulation had been upheld in spite of the lack of inten-
tional discrimination. See 448 u.s. at 479. His point was to 
demonstrate Congress' authority to condition the grant of federal 
funds on compliance with affirmative action guidelines. 
(b) The Powell and Marshall Concurring Opinions 
Both your concurring QPinion and Justice Marshall's opinion, 
~ ~ _./ 
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, reiterated that Title VI 
is coextensive with the 14th Ame~t and that the finding on 
----------~ 
the 14th Amendment issue therefore decided the Title VI issue. 
Id. at 517 n.S (Powell, J., concurring)~ 517 n.l. (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
5. Subsequent Federal Decisions 
I 
Like the CA2 here, most federal circuit courts have followed 
Bakke and 
tentional 
Harris in holding that Title VI requires proof of in-
discrimination. 
School Dis t. , 625 F. 2d 607 
See United States v. 
,..,... 
(CAS), cert. denied, 
Mar ion County 
451 u.s. 910 
(1981); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (CA6 
vl979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3079 (1981) ~ Cannon v. University 
of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 v{cA7), cert. denied, 102 s. Ct. 981 
(1981). The exception is the en bane CA3, which ruled unanimous--
ly that Title VI extends to discriminatory effects. NAACP v. 
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (CA3 1981) (en bane). 
6. Discussion 
Your views on the Title VI standard were established in Bakke 
Harris. Accordingly, my discussion focuses not on the con-
14. 
' 
gressional intent in enacting Title VI, but on various ways of 
dealing with the Lau-Bakke conflict. 
_....,- --
(a) Construing Bakke and Progeny: Is Lau Unaffected? 
Petitioners assert that Bakke and subsequent decisions should 
be narrowly construed so that Lau' s authority is undiminished. 
In this section I discuss the main arguments. 
(1) The Constitutional Standard as of 1964 
Amicus ACLU argues that even if Title VI was meant to incor-
porate the 14th Amendment standard, the standard in 1964 included 
an effects test. See Brief for ACLU at 23-36. In Bakke Justice 
Brennan refuted this argument: 
Congress specifically eschewed any static def-
inition of discrimination in favor of broad 
language that could be shaped by experience, 
administrative necessity, and evolving judi-
cial doctrine •.•. Specific definitions were 
undesirable, in the views of the legislation's 
principal backers, because Title VI's standard 
was that of the Constitution and one that 
could and should be administratively and judi-
cially applied .... Many questions, such as 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred only 
de jure discrimination or in at least some 
circumstances reached de facto discrimination, 
had not yet received an-authoritative judicial 
resolution. (438 u.s. at 337-39.) 
Thus Washington v. Davis decided the Title VI standard as well. 
(2) Bakke as Limited to the Affirmative Action Context 
The en bane CA3 interpreted the Powell and Brennan opinions 
in Bakke as standing only for the proposition that "when the 
charge is intentional discrimination in the nature of a govern-
mental preference, Title VI incorporates the constitutional stan-
dard." NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1330. Al-
15. 
though doubt certainly existed concerning Lau's vitality, "a re-
quiem may be premature and, in any event, should not be sung by 
this choir." Id. The court concluded that outside the context 
of affirmative action, an effects test was consistent with the 
congressional intent and with Titles VII and VIII. 
This proposed distinction -- which is petitioners' chief ar-
gument, see Brief for Petitioners at 32-35 -- might be plausible, 
had it been made in Bakke. But as Judge Justice wrote in United 
States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 430 (E.D. Tex. 1981), "the 
[Bakke] majority's finding of coextensiveness, based upon over-
whelming evidence of congressional intent, did not depend upon 
the details of each alleged act of discrimination. Either Con-
gress went beyond the constitutional notion of unlawful discrimi-
nation in enacting Title VI or it did not." 
Petitioners and their supporters attempt to limit Justice 
Brennan's opinion by noting that at one point it says: "We agree 
with MR. JUSTICE POWELL that, as applied to the case before us, 
Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the 
Equal Protection Clause . " 438 U.S. at 325 (emphasis add-
ed) . They also note that Justice Brennan stated that even if Lau 
remains valid, Bakke's case would not succeed. These marginal 
qualifications are overwhelmed, however, by the strong language 
--------------~ - --
of the rest of the Brennan opinion, such as the statement that 
--------------~ ______________ , 
Title VI and the 14th Amendment are "absolutely coextensive." 
Id. at 352. Justice Brennan directly attacked Lau's premise. In 
-. 
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my view he could not resurrect Lau unless he repudiated the heart 
of his Bakke analysis. 
(3) Harris as Superseding Bakke 
Amicus ACLU argues that since the Stennis Amendment applied 
both to the ESAA and Title VI, and since Harris held that the 
ESAA requires only discriminatory effects, Harris requires that 
Title VI also be interpreted as establishing an effects test. 
See Brief for ACLU at 10-12. I am not certain whether this argu-
ment is ingenious or disingenuous. The Harris decision turned 
precisely on the majority's finding that a different version of 
the Stennis Amendment applied to the ESAA than to Title VI. If 
this Court adopts the ACLU's argument, I dare say you will be 
able to write a rather powerful dissent. ·J ~ -1-v-zt .1 
(4) Fullilove as Superseding Bakke 
Petitioners argue that the Chief Justice's approving citation 
to Lau in Fullilove demonstrates Lau's continuing vitality. See 
Brief for Petitioners at 30. This reference to Lau unfortunately 
muddles the developing consensus that Lau erred in upholding an 
effects test. Still, the Chief Justice's limited purpose was to 
demonstrate that Congress may enact legislation designed to com-
bat the effects of discrimination -- something Congress indisput-
ably intended in creating the "minority business enterprise" pro-
gram. The Chief Justice offered no further comments on whether 
the Lau Court correctly decided that Congress had intended to 
enact an effects test under Title VI. This plurality opinion 
cannot be read as cutting back on the majority position in Bakke. 
17. 
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(b) Construing Lau: Must it be Overruled under Bakke? 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that Bakke unambiguous-
ly states that the Title VI standard is the constitutional intent 
standard. The next question is whether this means Lau must be 
overruled. In this section I discuss various interpretations of 
Lau and attempt to identify a basis on which to distinguish it 
from Bakke. 
(1) Lau as Involving Intentional Discrimination 
Finding that the San Francisco school district • s failure to 
provide special help for non-English-speaking students constitut-
ed intentional discrimination would enable the Court to dismiss 
Lau•s statement on discriminatory effects as dictum. Unfortu-
nately this will not work. In Lau the CA9 found that discrimina-
tory purpose had not been alleged or proven. 483 F.2d at 796-97. 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion relied on this finding as 
well. Lau must be construed as involving only discriminatory 
effects. 
(2) Deference to Agency Construction of the Statute 
Both Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart relied on the HEW 
regulations, and Justice Stewart specifically cited deference to 
administrative construction as a basis for his decision. Peti-
tioners defend Lau on this basis. 
This seems to be a chief rationale of Lau. Certainly the 
Court did not purport to rely on its own analysis of Title VI and 
the legislative history. But this interpretation fails to pro- } 
vide a basis for reconciling Lau with Bakke • 
. , 
·' 
The same basic 
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regulation (see p. 9 supra) was written for all relevant agen-
cies. Therefore, deferring to the HEW in Lau means deferring to 
the Department of Labor in this case. Even if such deference 
once was warranted, 3 it no longer is appropriate now that the 
Court has set forth its own conclusive construction of the legis-
lative history. 
(3) Deference to Agency Authority 
Petitioners argue that even if Title VI contains only an in-
tent standard, agencies reasonably may impose an effects test. 
See Brief for Petitioners at 29-31. They rely (as did Justice 
Stewart in Lau) on Mourning v. Family Publications Services, 
Inc., 411 u.s. 356 (1973), which held that an agency regulation 
promulgated under a general authorization provision "will be sus-
tained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of 
the enabling legislation.'" Id. at 369 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing 
Author i t y , 3 9 3 U • S • 2 6 8 , 2 8 0-81 ( 19 6 9) ) • In pe t i t ion e r s ' view , 
the administrative problems of proving intent make an effects 
test reasonable. For support, they cite Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 u.s. 641 (1966), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 
3under current standards, only limited deference should 
have been given to the HEW or other agency constructions. In FEC 
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 102 S. Ct. 37, 44---
(1981), this Court reaffirmed that "the thoroughness, validity 
and consistency of an agency's reasoning are factors that bear 
upon the amount of deference to be given an agency's ruling." In 
this instance the agencies issued the regulations without 
explanation. See 29 Fed. Reg. 16298 (Dec. 4, 1964). Thus no 
reasons were given why an effects test was deemed appropriate and 
consistent with Title VI. 
,, 
4> Jr( 'kb;.;f ~ - a-- 1-u~ ~ -
J,/2.:.. ~I~~ 6-( ~
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156 (1980) , which held that' Congress may enact an effects stan-
dard even though the 14th and 15th Amendments provide only an 
intent standard. ~ 
I believe this argument must be rejected. a The question of 
I intent vs . e f fee t-s--i-s_ a __ c_r_u_c_i_a_l_ q'-u_e_s ..... t .... i_o_n_ o_f substantive pol icy , n~ve convenience. I do not read Mourning or any 
other case as standing for the general proposition that an agency 
may broaden a statute's reach merely by enacting a regulation. 4 
Katzenbach and City of Rome deal with congressional power under 
constitutional amendments, not with agency power under an Act of 
Congress. The two relationships should not be equated. 
In any event, this construction of Lau applies to all agency 
regulations, including those at issue in this case. It therefore 
provides no basis for narrowing or distinguishing Lau. 
(4) The Contract Theory 
Petitioners also rely on Justice Douglas' argument in Lau 
that the school district had bound itself by contract to follow 
the regulations. See Brief for Petitioners at 31-32. I do not 
agree that an invalid regulation must be followed if the promul-
gating agency has extracted a general promise that all regula-
tions will be followed. In addition, the contract theory, like 
4I note, for example, that neither the majority nor 
dissent in Harris suggested that the validity of the HEW 
regulation might be independent of the standard enacted by 
Congress under the ESAA. Yet the argument would have been as 
applicable in Harris as in Lau. 
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the theories based on deference to agencies, fails to distinguish 
the Lau situation from any other. 
(5) Reliance on a Specific Agency Requirement 
One might construe Lau as emphasizing the specific HEW re-
quirement that a school system take "affirmative steps" to deal 
with the problem of non-English-speaking students. No comparable 
regulation exists in this case, i.e., no regulation under Title 
VI specifying what type of civil service tests should/should not 
be used. Lau thus might be read as following that specific regu-
lation, rather than the more general regulation (which applies in 
the case at hand) prohibiting criteria or methods of administra-
tion that have the effect of discrimination. 
This interpretation fails to explain where HEW received au-
thority to require affirmative steps in the absence of a finding 
of purposeful discrimination. If Title VI merely incorporates 
the constitutional standard, then such a remedy may not be im-
posed until de jure discrimination is demonstrated. Moreover, 
the HEW "requirement" actually was a mere clarifiying memorandum 
interpreting the general regulation. 
(6) Limiting the Effects Test to Funding Termination 
This argument was suggested in an article published just pri-
or to the Lau decision. Administrative power to issue regula-
tions derives from §602 of Title VI, which establishes the admin-
istrative mechanism for handling possible funding termination. 
But a private action is brought under §601, which sets forth the 







test would govern funding termination but would not apply in pri-
vate actions. See Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protection for Non-
English-Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 Calif. L. 
Rev . 15 7 , 1 7 0 ( 19 7 4) • 
This two-tier standard would mean that certain policies could 
result in funding termination but not in injunctive relief or 
damages. I see no basis for this in the legislative history. 
Just as I think Congress meant either to create a complete pri-
vate right of action or none at all, see pp.7-8 supra, I think 
Congress meant to create only one Title VI standard. 
(7) Lau as Involving a Total Deprivation of Education 
In United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 428 n.l2 (E.D. 
Tex. 1981), Judge Justice suggested, but did not use, the follow-
ing theory of Lau: 
In Lau v. Nichols, .•. the Supreme Court 
observea-that students who do not understand 
English and are placed in all-English class-
rooms "are certain to find their classroom 
experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no 
way meaningful." Such students, the 
Court found, "are effectively foreclosed from 
~ meaningful education." (emphasis added) 
Thus it could be argued that the defendants' 
failure to provide appropriate remedial in-
struction to Spanish-speaking children consti-
tutes, in effect, an absolute deprivation of 7 
education, impinging upon a fun~amentai right 
and triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause. (Citations omitted.) 
Since Title VI incorporates the constitutional standard, this 
absolute deprivation violates Title VI. 
This is a plausible basis -- perhaps the only one -- for re-
affirming Lau's mandate while discarding Lau's reasoning. But it 
.. , ~ 
-
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has problems, not the least of which is that there is virtually 
no support for it in Lau. The theory requires use of the "total 
deprivation" exception to San Antonio School District v. Rodri- r 
guez, 411 u.s. 1 (1973). Although the same was true in Plyler v. 
Doe, 50 u.S.L.W. 4650 (June 15, 1982) , 5 that decision was hotly 
contested. The Plyler dissenters likely would refuse to go along 
here, and even some members of the majority may not want to ex- ~ 
pand the exception to cover a case where it is not certain that 
the children are suffering a total deprivation of education. In 
addition, the creation of a new theory to justify Lau's result 
without Lau's reasoning might look a bit ridiculous. 
(c) Pragmatic Considerations on Overruling Lau: Preserving 
the Result while Rejecting the Rationale 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Lau conflicts with 
Bakke. Your Bakke reasoning is sound, and I see no reason for 
you to abandon it. 6 At a minimum, then, Lau's reasoning with 
5Judge Justice suggested that strict scrutiny would apply 
in a case of total deprivation. Plyler v. Doe holds only that 
heightened scrutiny is appropriate. This difference does not 
ffect the argument. 
6 I would note an additional practical argument, not raised 
the briefs, why the Lau standard should be overruled. The 
pervasive~es~ ot federa~unding makes Title VI widely 
applicable. This is true regarding large metropolitan school 
dlstridts. If Title VI outlaws discriminatory effects, then it 
forbids de facto school segregation. The Court's constitut1onal 
aecisions on schooL aesegregation- would become irrelevant. A new 
body of law would have to be developed. 
This issue is briefly discussed in Benjes, Heubert & O'Brien, 
The Legality of Minimum Competency Test Programs Under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 537, 
545-46 (1980). The authors argue for an effects standard, but 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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regard to Title VI must be overruled. 
Overruling a prior rationale always involves some problems, 
but doing so here should not prove difficult. The remarkable I 
feature of Lau is the complete absence of analysis of Title VI 
and its legislative history to s~her ~ effe~t;::; i :;:nt 
standard was intended. (This absence is especially noteworthy 
given that neither the CA9 majority nor dissent discussed the 
Title VI issue; both focused only on the Equal Protection Clause. 
See 483 F.2d 791.) Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart simply 
deferred to the agency's regulations without evaluating their 
consistency with the legislative history. Lau can be overruled, 
therefore, with a minimum of accompanying embarassment in having 
to discard a prior interpretation of the legislative history. 
Overturning the result in Lau, however, would have a large 
impact on education for non-English-speaking students. A brief 
~~-------------~-----------~,--------------
post-Lau history demonstrates this problem. 
After this Court's decision in 1974, the Office of Education 
issued the "Lau remedies," guidelines to be used by HEW in evalu-
ating school districts' compliance with Lau. The guidelines em-
concede that Congress did not intend Title VI to prohibit de 
facto school segregation. As a result, they are reduced to 
arguing that Congress still may have intended an effects standard 
to govern all other areas covered by Title VI. I have seen 
nothing in the legislative history that indicates an intent to 
create such a dual standard. 
I have not researched this issue. At some point it might be 
worth discovering how courts have treated school desegregation 
claims under Title VI. 
24. 
phasized use of bilingual education. Approximately 500 school 
districts, which contain about 90% of all affected students, en-
tered into agreements with HEW to institute bilingual programs. 
At present about 800,000 students are being taught in their na-
tive languages. 
In 1980 Secretary of Education Hufstedler proposed regula-
tions to require bilingual programs. Congress blocked their im-
plementation, and Secretary of Education Bell withdrew them in 
February 1981. The new Secretary wanted to permit school dis-
tricts to use alternative remedies, such as intensive English 
instruction. He made clear, however, that the administration 
would continue to enforce the Lau mandate that schools receiving 
I I "-' 
federal funds do something to help students who cannot speak En-
glish. Nonetheless, the decision caused an enormous outcry from 
Hispanic and other minority groups. (The information in this 
section is reported in wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1982, All; Feb. 7, 
1981, AS; and Feb. 3, 1981, Al.) 
If Lau is overruled, the regulations promulgated pursuant to 
Title VI may become unlawful. School systems then could drop all 
efforts to provide special help for non-English-speaking stu-
dents. This will constitute a major change in federal policy. - ---- ---- .. 
Regardless of its views on the policy, this Court presumably 
would like to avoid being the catalyst for such a change, given 
that this Court was the original source of the policy. 
For these reasons, a desirable outcome would be to overrule 
., "" \\ 
Lau only insofar as it validates a ge_!lerEl effects test under -
,. 
45. 
Title VI. Unfortunately, as the previous section indicates, it 
is difficult to find a basis for distinguishing the specific reg-
·----~ 
ulation upheld in Lau. The practical effects of overruling Lau's 
result, however, make this a worthwhile inquiry. 
c. Standard of Proof in §1981 Actions 
In General Building Contractors Assocation, Inc. v. Pennsyl-
vania, No. 81-280 (June 29, 1982), this Court decided (7-2) that 
liability may not be imposed under §1981 without proof of inten-
tional discrimination. Accordingly, the CA2' s holding on this 
issue must be affirmed. 
III. Conclusion (!} ~ ~ 
-h:> 4~,1 rze \ 
If the Court holds that no private right of ac t ion exists 
under Title VI, no decision will be necessary on the proper stan-
dard of discrimination. It appears from Cannon, however, that a 
slim majority of the Court is prepared to imply an action under 
Title VI. The Court therefore must decide whether Title VI ere-
ates an intent standard or an effects standard. Bakke should ---- -control. Lau's reasoning should be overruled. If possible, the .. 
Court should find and apply a reasonable basis for preserving the 
result in Lau. This will minimize the disruption caused by the 
Court's reversal of position. 
81-431~ ASSN. v . CIVIL SERVICE~ . Argued 11/1/82 
{ ~'U,!1f. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Although I still have not finally come to rest in 
this case, I have made a discovery that bears on the 
question whether stare decisis requires adherence to 
the view expressed by Bill Brennan and Lewis Powell in 
their separate writing in Bakke to the effect that the 
I Title VI standard is coextensive with the constitutional standard. One reason that I had thought 
the combination of five votes for those two opinions 
might not have precedential effect is that there was no 
single Court opinion for t~hsition. I have since 
found, however, that in th Weber case, 443 U.S. 193, 
206 uote 6, the Court did e y hold that Title 
VI I, unl ike Title VI was not intended to incorporate 
the constitutional standard. That footnote seems to 
espouse the theory that Title VI deals with 
governmental activity and therefore appropriately 
adopts the same standard as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The footnote then states: "Title VII, by 
contrast, was enacted pursuant to the commerce power to 
regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not 
intended to incorporate and particularize the commands 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Title VII and 
Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari materia." 
I 
This seems to me to be an adoption by the Court of the 
rationale expounded by the Brennan-Powell opinions. 
.. . ... 
.. 
-2-
Although, as I have indicated, I still am somewhat 
uncertain about how to deal with this case, it does 
seem to me that this footnote in an opinion by the 
Court len§s substantial suppor t to the view that Title 
VI incorporates an i n t ent standard and must be read 
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Re: 81-431- Guardians Ass'n., et al. v. Civil service Commission 
of City of New York, et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
During the vote at Conference, I passed on this case. I have 
since decided to vote to affirm the judgment below, on the 
view that no implied private cause of action exists in this case. 
As you are by now aware, I have assigned the opinion to Justice 
White. 
,, 
Justice Marshall ~ r I / 
.ij.tstice Blackmun 
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1st DRAFT 
~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~~1-0 No. 81-431 
 1t GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION~~ 
1.,.. _,... _ ~ k, ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE ~ 
~ )'~ ~"-"--' CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
~~ ~ ./ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF {;)J ~ 
.) 7J ' v APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT r ~.kJ_ · 
'WA_.M..-""1:.£.'"/A.IIo..,....'1~..,_.,-i ~ [December-, 1982] f-1.u.._ 
JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. ~~~~ 
We address in this case whether a plaintiff is entitled to t(' 
compensatory relief in a private action alleging violations of _ 
1
_ -
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000d, ~~ '' ~ 
et seq. 1 We hold that such relief may not be obtained; de- _ ~ 
claratory and prospective injunctive relief are the only avail-~~ 
able private remedies for Title VI violations. 
~~ 
This class action involves a c~allenge by black and Hispanic /..~--
police officers, petitioners here, 2 to several written examina- , -,r~ 
tions administered by New York City between 1968 and 1970 ~  
that were used to make entry-level appointments to the city's 1 . 
police department (the "Department") through October 1'-0 ~ ~ 
1974.3 The District Court found that the challenged exami- ~ 
' Section 601 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, provides: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." 
2 The class representatives are The Guardians Association of the New 
York City Police Department, Inc., The Hispanic Society of the New York 
City Police Department, Inc. , and Oswaldo Perez and Felix E. Santos. 
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nations had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass-
rates of blacks and Hispanics and were not job-related. 
These findings were not disturbed in the Court of Appeals. 
Each member of the plaintiff class seeking relief from 
discrimination achieved a passing score on one of the chal-
lenged examinations and was hired as a police officer. Since 
appointments were made in order of test score, however, the 
examinations caused the class members to be hired later than 
similarly-situated whites, which lessened the petitioners' se-
niority and related benefits. Accordingly, when the Depart-
ment laid off police officers in June 1975 on a "last-hired, 
first-fired" basis, those officers who had achieved the lowest 
scores on the examinations were laid off first, and the plain-
tiff black and Hispanic officers were disproportionately af-
fected by the layoffs. 
On April 30, 1976, petitioners filed the present suit 4 
against the Department and other New York City officials 
and entities, the respondents here. Petitioners' amended 
complaint alleged that the June 1975 layoffs violated their 
rights under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,42 U.S. C. §§2000d, et seq., and 2000e, et seq., under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983, and under various other state and federal 
laws. 5 The primary allegation of the complaint was that but 
quirement discriminated against Hispanics. The disposition of this issue 
in the lower courts is not now before us. 
'This was petitioners' second judicial attack on the Department's use of 
the examinations. Petitioners first filed suit in 1972, but the District 
Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the mak-
ing of appointments from the ranked eligibility lists generated by the chal-
lenged examinations, on the basis that the eligibility lists would soon be 
fully exhausted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 400 (CA2 1973). Petitioners unsuccess-
fully sought to revive the earlier case before filing the present suit. See 
633 F. 2d 232, 235 (CA2 1980). 
"Among these was a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which the District 
Court twice rejected because petitioners failed to prove discriminatory in-
tent, which the court found to be a necessary element of a § 1981 cause of 
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for the discriminatory impact of the challenged examinations 
upon minorities, petitioners would have been hired earlier 
and therefore would have accumulated sufficient seniority to 
withstand the layoffs. 
After a hearing, the District Court held that, although pe-
titioners had failed to prove that the respondents had acted 
with discriminatory intent, the use of the exams violated Ti-
tle VII, because the tests had a disparate impact upon minor-
ities and were not proven by respondents to be job-related. 6 
The court therefore granted petitioners' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining the Department from firing or re-
calling any police officers until seniority 1ists were reordered 
to accord petitioners the seniority they would have had but 
for respondents' discriminatory practices. 431 F. Supp. 526 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). In light of its holding under Title VII, the 
District Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the merits of 
petitioners' claims under Title VI. Id., at 530, n. 2. 
On respondents' appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the 
District Court's decision and remanded the case for reconsid-
eration in light of our holding in Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324 (1977), in which we ruled that a bona fide se-
niority system that merely perpetuates the effects of pre-Ti-
tle VII discrimination is protected by § 703(h) of that statute, 
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 562 F. 2d 38 (CA2 1977). On re-
mand, the District Court found that Teamsters had rendered 
its previous holding untenable to the extent that it granted 
action. 431 F.Supp. 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 466 F .Supp. 1273, 1276, n. 
4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 633 F. 2d 232, 
263-268 (CA2 1980). Petitioners raised this § 1981 issue in their petition 
for certiorari, but they abandoned it after our decision last Term in General 
Building Contractors Ass'n , Inc . v. Pennsylvania, - U. S. -, 
(1982), decided the issue adversely to them. See Petrs. Reply Brief, at 1, 
n. *. 
6 The District Court correctly relied on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U. S. 424 (1971), and its progeny, as the framework for its Title VII dispa-
rate impact analysis. 431 F.Supp., at 538-539. 
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relief with respect to discrimination occurring prior to March 
24, 1972, the date on which Title VII became applicable to 
municipalities. See Pub.L. 92--261 § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
This meant that, under Title VII, class members hired prior 
to the effective date were not entitled to any relief, and that 
the remaining members of the class were only entitled to 
back seniority awards that did not take into account time pe-
riods prior to that date. 466 F.Supp. 1273, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979). 
The court then turned to Title VI, which has been appli-
cable to municipalities since its enactment in 1964, to see if 
that provision would provide relief for the time periods prior 
to March 24, 1972. After considering Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 
66 (1975), and the various opinions in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), the District 
Court concluded that an im lied rivate ri ht of action ex-
iste n er 1t e . 6 .Supp., at 1281-85. en, citing 
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), and Title VI adminis-
trative interpretative regulations adopted by several federal 
agencies, the court reasoned that proof of discriminatory ef-
fect is enough to establish a violation of Title VI in a private 
action, thereby rejecting respondents' contention that only 
proof of discriminatory intent could suffice. !d., at 1285-87. 
Finally, turning to the question of relief, the court held that 
the same remedies available under Title VII should be avail-
able under Title VI, unless they would conflict with some 
purpose peculiar to Title VI. "In the instant case, back se-~ 
niority, approved as a Title VII remedy in Franks V. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 
L.Ed. 2d 444 (1976), is just as necessary to make 
discriminatees 'whole' under Title VI." 466 F. Supp., at 
1287. 
Accordingly, relief was granted to the entire class pursu-
ant to Title VI. In a subsequent order, the court set forth a 
detailed plan for the determination of the constructive senior-
ity to which each individual member of the class would be en-
titled, and the corresponding monetary and nonmonetary en-
81--431-0PINION 
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titlements that would be derived therefrom. The court also 
ordered respondents to meet and consult with petitioners on 
the preparation and use of future examinations. Joint App., 
at A99-A107. 
Respondents appealed once again to the Second Circuit, 
which affirmed the relief under Title VII but reversed as to 
Title VI. 633 F. 2d 232 (CA2 1980). All three members of 
the panel agreed that the award of Title VI relief could not be 
sustained, but the panel divided on the rationale for this con-
clusion. The majority held that the trial court erred by con-
cluding that Title VI does not require proof of discriminatory 
intent. They believed that this Court's decision in Lau v. 
Nichols, supra, which held that proof of discriminatory im-
pact could suffice to establish a Title VI violation, had been 
implicitly overruled by the judgment and supporting opinions 
in Bakke, supra. 633 F. 2d at, 270 (Kelleher, J.); id., at 
274-75 (Coffrin, J.). 
The third member of the pan , Judge Meskill, eclined to 
reach the question whether Tit re uir roof of dis-
criminatory intent. Instead, he concluded that the "compen-
satory remedies sought by and awarded to plaintiffs in the 
case at bar are not available to private litigants under Title 
VI." /d., at 255. Nothing in the legislative history, Judge 
Meskill observed, indicated that Title VI was intended to 
compensate individuals excluded from the benefits of a pro-
gram receiving federal assistance, and in his view a compen-
satory private remedy would work at cross-purposes with the 
administrative enforcement mechanism expressly provided 
by §602 of Title VI, 42 U.S. C. §§2000d-1, and with the ob-
jectives of the federal assistance statutes. 633 F. 2d, at 
255-62. 7 
' The panel majority disagreed with Judge Meskill's views, reading our 
decisions in Bakke and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 
(1979), as allowing a private right of action under Title VI irrespective of 
the compensatory effect of the relief sought or granted. Also, fearing that 
part of the noncompensatory relief in the District Court's order might not 
81-431-0PINION 
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After the Second Circuit denied petitions for rehearing 
from both sides, -- F. 2d - (CA2 1981), we granted the 
plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, -- U. S. --,8 which 
claimed error solely on the basis that proof of discriminatory 
intent is not required to establish a Title VI violation. 
II 
The Court squarely held in Lau v. Nichols, supra, that Ti-
tle VI forbids ~use of federalrunds not only in programs 
that intentionally discriminate on the grounds of race but also 
in those endeavors that have a disparate impact on racial mi-
norities. The Court of Appeals recognized this but was of 
the view, as are respondents, that Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, supra, had confined the reach of Title 
VI to those programs that are operated in an intentionally 
discriminatory manner. Petitioners respond that although 
five members of the Court in Bakke concluded that, with re-
spect to the issue then before the Court, Title VI imposed no 
stricter standard than does the Constitution, that case in-
volved an express racial classification and addressed only 
whether Title VI barred that classification even though the 
Constitution might not; whether Title VI reaches discrimina-
tory impact as well as discriminatory intent was therefore 
not at issue in that case. 
We n~d !)Q.t resolve these conflicting views as to wb.e.ther 
Lau v. Nichols s- rvived Bakke unimpaired with respect to 
whether Title VI prohibits disparate racial impact as well as -----
be available to the entire class under Title VII , the court could not agree 
with Judge Meskill's conclusion that his rationale made it unnecessary to 
decide whether Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. 633 F . 
2d, at 274. 
8 Respondents also filed a petition for certiorari, in which they seek re-
view of the Court of Appeals' determination that the plaintiff class is enti-
tled to relief under Title VII. Civil Service Comm'n v. The Guardians 
Ass'n, No. 81-432. The petition does not merit certiorari and we deny it. 
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intentional discrimination. Although respondents did not in-
clude the question in their petition for certiorari, they defend 
th~nt of the Court of Appeals in this_ case on the al-
t~~tive ound that no priv~e c~se of action j s available 
under Title VI that Will afford petitioners the relief which 
they-seek in this case. 9 This submission is permissible un-
der our prior cases. United States v. New York Telephone 
Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dayton Board of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977); Hankerson v. 
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240, n. 6 (1977); Langnes v. 
Green, 282 U. S. 531, 535-539 (1931); United States v. Amer-
ican Railway Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435-436 (1924). 
Since we agree that the relief denied petitioners under Title 
VII is unavailable under Title VI, we affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
III 
In ~u v. Nichols, supra, non-English speaking Chinese 
students sought relief against the San Francisco school dis-
trict, claiming that they should be taught the English lan-
guage, that instruction should proceed in Chinese, or that 
some other way should be provided to afford them equal edu-
cational opportunity. This Court, reversing the Court of I 
Appeals, gave relief under Title VI. The existence of a pri-
vate cause of action under that Title, however, was not dis-
puted in that case. 
Four years later, the Court decided Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, supra, which also involved a pri-
vate suit seeking relief under Title VI against state educa-
tional authorities. Four Justices assumed, but did not 
decide, that a private action was available under Title VI. 10 
9 See Resps. Brief, at 8-9; Oral Arg. Trans., at 21-22. 
10 483 U. S., at 281-284 (POWELL, J.); id., at 328 (BRENNAN, MAR-
SHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). 
" '<'' 
81-431-0PINION 
8 GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N.Y.C. 
A fifth Justice was of the view that no private cause of action 
could be implied under the Title. 11 The four remaining Jus-
tices concluded that a private action was available. 12 
Still later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 
667 (1979), the Court, applying the factors specified in Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), held that private parties could sue 
to enforce the prohibitions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681, et seq., against 
gender-based discrimination in any educational program sup-
ported by federal funds. A major part of the analysis was 
that Title IX had been derived from Title VI, that Congress 
understood that private remedies were available under Title 
VI, and that Congress intended simiar remedies to be avail-
able under Title IX. 441 U. S., at 694-703. Furthermore, 
it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court's opinion 
that the congressional view was correct as to the availability 
of private actions to enforce Title VI. Id., at 710-716. Two 
Justices, in dissent, were of the view that private remedies 
under Title VfltSelf were not available and that the same 
was true under Title IX. Those Justices, however, asserted 
that § 1983 was available to enforce the proscriptions of Title 
VI and Title IX where the alleged discriminatory practices 
were being carried on under the color of state law. Id., at 
717-730 (WHITE, J., dissenting, joined by BLACKMUN, J.) . 
Thus at least eight Justices in Cannon were of the view that 
Title VI ~md TitTe IX could be enforced in a priv~ action 
against a state or local agency receiving federal funds, such 
as the respondent Department. 13 See also Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980). 
11 I d., at 379 (WHITE, J.). This Justice, however, was of the view that 
where the alleged discriminatory conduct constitutes state action, a cause 
of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is available. 
12 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
419-421, 420, n. 28 (1978) (STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C.J., Stewart 
and REHNQUIST, JJ.). 
13 One Justice disagreed with the Court's holding that a private right of 
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IV 
It does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entitled 
to a "make whole" remedy for repondent's alleged Title VI 
violations. Whether a litigant has a cause of action "is an- , 
alytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if 
any, a litigant may be entitled to receive." Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 239 (1979). The usual rule is that 
where legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is 
available, a federal court may use any available remedy to af-
ford full relief. Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946). 
The general rule nevertheless yields where necessary to 
carry out the intent of Congress or to avoid frustrating the 
purposes of the sta!Jlte involved. 
For example, in"'Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), the Court found that a private 
right of action for only limited relief could be implied under 
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§80b-1, 
et seq., which prohibits certain practices in connection with 
investment advisory contracts. Section 215 of the Act de-
clared that contracts whose formation or performance would 
violate the Act were void, and the Court concluded that Con-
gress intended "that the customary legal incidence of void-
ance would follow, including the availability of a suit for reci-
sion or for an injunction against continued operation of the 
contract." 444 U. S., at 19. But the Court refused t(Ulllow 
recovea of monetary relief in a E.rivate §.Uit alleging viola-
tions of the Act, stating that, in the absence of a contrary leg-
islative intent, "where a statute expressly provides a particu-
lar remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading 
others into it." Ibid. 
We ~~low "make whole" remedies in 
private actions seeking relief for violations of statutes passed 
action could be implied under Title IX itself, without expressing a view as 
to whether Title IX could be privately enforced via§ 1983. 441 U. S., at 
730-749 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
l . f. 
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by Congress pursuant to its "power under the Spending 
Clause to place conditions on the grant of federal funds." 
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 15 
(1981). This is because the receipt of federal funds under 
typical spending clause legislation is a consensual matter: the 
state or other grantee weighs the benefits and burdens be-
fore accepting the funds and agreeing to comply with the con-
ditions attached to their receipt. Typically, before funds are 
advanced, the appropriate federal official will determine 
whether the grantee's plan, proposal or program will satisfy 
the conditions of the grant or other extension of federal 
funds, and the grantee will have in mind what its obligations 
will be. When in a later private suit brought by those for 
whose benefit the federal money was intended to be used it is 
determined, contrary to the state's position, that the condi-
tions attached to the funds are not being complied with, it 
may be that the recipient would rather terminate its receipt 
of federal money rather than assume the unanticipated 
burdens. 
Thus, the Court has more than once announced that in 
fashioning remedies for violations of Spending Clause stat-
utes by recipients of federal funds, the courts must recog-
nize that the recipient has "alternative choices of assuming 
the additional costs" of complying with what a court has an-
nounced is necessary to conform to federal law or "of not us-
ing federal funds" and withdrawing from the federal program 
entirely. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420-421 (1970). 
Although a court may identify the violation and enjoin its 
continuance or order recipients of federal funds prospectively 
to perform their duties incident to the receipt of federal 
money, the recipient has the option of withdrawing and hence 
terminating the prospective force of the injunction. 
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, supra, reiterated 
the Rosado approach: Remedies to enforce spending power 
statutes must respect the privilege of the recipient of federal 
funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt of federal money 
-~ 
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rather than assume the further obligations and duties that a 
court has declared are necessary for compliance. 451 
U. S., at 29--30, 30, n. 23; id., at 53-55 (WHITE, J., dissenting 
in part). The Court noted that "in no [Spending Clause] 
case-have we required a state to provide money to plain-
tiffs, much less less required" a state to assume more burden-
some obligations. !d., at 29. Thus, declaratory and pro-
spective relief are presumed to be the only proper remedies 
in such cases. Absent clear congressional intent or valid 
regulatory or contractual provisions to the contrary, addi-
tional relief in the form of money or otherwise based upon 
past violations that a court might identify should be withheld. 
v 
Title VI is a spending power enactment: 
~
"It is not a regulatory measure, but an exercise of the 
unquestioned power of the Federal Government to 'fix 
the terms on which Federal funds shall be disbursed.' 
Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127, 
143 (1947). No recipient is required to accept Federal 
aid. If he does so voluntarily, he must take it on the 
conditions on which it is offered." 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 
(1964) (Sen. Humphrey). 
Accord, id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. Geller) (validity 
of Title VI "rests on the power of Congress to fix the terms 
on which Federal funds will be made available"); id., at 6562 
(Sen. Kuchel); id. , at 7063 (Sen. Pastore). Title VI rests on 
the principle that "taxpayers' money, which is collected with-
out discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination." 
I d., at 7064 (Sen. Ribicoff). Accord, id., at 7054-55, 7062 
(Sen. Pastore); id., at 7102 (Sen. Javits); id., at 6566 (memo-
randum by the Republican Members of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary). The mandate of Title VI is "[ v ]ery simple. 
Stop the discrimination, get the money; continue the 
discrimination, do not get the money.'' I d., at 1542 (Rep. 
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Lindsay). Title VI imposes no obligations but simply "'ex-
tends an option'" that potential recipients are free to accept 
or reject. Id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. 
Celler)(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480 
(1923)). This legislative history clearly shows that Congress 
intended Title VI to be a typical "contractual" spending 
power provision. 
Therefore, since Title VI is Spending Clause legislation, 
we must presume that private litigants seeking to enforce 
compliance with its terms are entitled to no more than the 
limited remedy deemed available to the plaintiffs in 
Pennhurst. Our inquiry is not at this point complete, how-
ever, because, like all rules of statutory construction, the 
Pennhurst presumption must "yield ... to persuasive evi-
dence of contrary legislative intent." Transamerica, supra, 
444 U. S., at 20. As in Transamerica, our inquiry into the 
relevant legislative history reveals that "what evidence of in-
tent exists in this case, circumstantial though it may be, 
weighs against the implication of a private right of action for 
a monetary award in a case such as this." Ibid. 
T~e VI does not explicitly allow for any form of a priv!lte 
right of action. This fact did not go unnoticed by Senators 
Keating and Ribicoff, who unsuccessfully proposed an 
amendment adding to Title VI a provision expressly allowing 
the institution of "a civil action or other proper proceeding for 
preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, ... 
by the person aggrieved." 109 Cong. Rec. 15375 (1963). 
Senator Keating explained that, under this proposal, if some-
one violated Title VI, funds could be denied or "a suit for spe-
cific performance of the nondiscrimination requirement could 
be brought . . . by the victim of the discrimination." I d., at 
15376. The relevant language of the proposed amendment is 
identical to that of§ 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000a-3(a), the provision creating a private right 
of action to enforce Title II of the Act, which deals with 
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discrimination in public accommodations. Suits under 
§ 204(a) are "private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an 
action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he 
obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also 
as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Con-
gress considered of the highest priority." Newman v. Pig-
gie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 401-402 (1968). Sena-
tor Keating thought that elementary fairness required that 
victims of Title VI-proscribed discrimination be accorded the 
same private right of action as allowed in the "proposed edu-
cation and public accommodations titles of the [Civil Rights] 
bill." 14 
The Keating-Ribicoffproposal was not included in Title VI, 
but the important point for present purposes is that even the 
most ardent advocates of private enforcement of Title VI 
contemplated that private plaintiffs would only be awarded 
"preventive relief." Like the drafters of Title II, they did 
not intend to allow private plaintiffs to recover monetary 
awards. Although the expressed intent of Senators Keating 
and Ribicoff is alone not determinative of whether a compen-
satory remedy may be obtained in a private action to enforce 
Title VI, "it is one more piece of evidence that Congress did 
not intend to authorize a cause of action for anything beyond 
limited equitable relief." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 22. 
The remaining indications of congressional intent are also 
circumstantial, but they all militate in favor of the conclusion 
that only an award of prospective relief is appropriate as a 
private remedy for Title VI violations. The "greatest possi-
ble emphasis" was given to the fact that the "real objective" 
of Title VI was "the elimination of discrimination in the use 
and receipt of Federal funds." 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) 
(Sen. Humphrey). See also id., at 7062 (Sen. Pastore). The 
14 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731 and 
S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 335 (1963) (Sen. Keating). 
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remedy of termination of assistance was regarded as "a last 
resort, to be used only if all else fails," because "cutoffs of 
Federal funds would defeat important objectives of Federal 
legislation, without commensurate gains in eliminating racial 
discrimination or segregation." Id., at 6544, 6546 (Senator 
Humphrey). 15 
To ensure that this intent would be respected, Congress in-
cluded an explicit provision in § 602 of Title VI that requires 
that any administrative enforcement action be "consistent 
with the achievement of the objective of the statute authoriz-
ing the financial assistance in connection with which the ac-
tion is taken." 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1. Although an award 
of damages would not be as drastic a remedy as a cutoff of 
funds, we agree with Judge Meskill that the possibility of 
large monetary liability might well dissuade potential 
nondiscriminating recipients from participating in federal 
programs, thereby hindering the objectives of the funding 
statutes. See 633 F. 2d, at 261-262. 
In summary, then, we find no legislative history that in 
anyWay rebuts tl!_e Pennhurst presumption that only pro-
spective relie1 sfioUia'lie graiitea as a remedy for violations of 
statutes passed pursuant to the spending power. Quite the 
contrary, what little evidence there is evinces an intent not to 
allow any greater relief. We therefore hold that compensa-
tory relief, or other relief based on past violations of the con-
ditions attached use of federal funds, is not available as a pri-
vate remedy for Title VI violations. 16 
15 See also, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1520 (1964) (Rep. Geller); id, at 7063 
(Sen. Pastore); id., at 7075 (Sen. Ribicoff). 
16 The lower courts are generally in agreement with this conclusion. 
See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F . 2d 1185 (CA71981) (Title 
IX case), cert. denied, - U. S.- (1982); Drayden v. Needville Inde-
pendent School District, 642 F. 2d 129, 133 (CA5 1981); Nabke v. HUD, 
520 F.Supp. 5, 10-11 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. In-
dian Trails Apartments, 496 F.Supp. 522, 526-527 (N.D. Ill. 1980); 
Rendon v. Utah State Dept. of Employment Security Job Service, 454 
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VI 
If the relief unavailable under Title VII and ordered under 
Title VI is the kind of relief that should be withheld in en-
forcing a Spending Clause statute, we should affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without more. Only if all or 
some of this relief is the kind of declaratory or prospective 
relief that private enforcement of Title VI properly contem-
plates need we determine whether proof of intentional 
discrimination is an essential element of petitioner's cause of 
action based on Title VI. To resolve this matter, we now 
consider the items of relief ordered by the District Court to 
determine if any element is a permissible prospective 
remedy. 
Although the Eleventh Amendment cases are not dispos-
itive here, in holding that only prospective relief is available 
to remedy violations of federal law by state officials, the 
Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667 (1974), ob-
served that the difference between permissible and imper-
missible relief "will not in many instances be that between 
night and day." It seems as patent here as in the Eleventh 
Amendment context that prospective relief cannot include a 
monetary award for past wrongs, even if the award is in the 
form of "equitable restitution" instead of damages. See id., 
at 665-667. However, prospective relief need not be "totally 
without effect on the [defendant's] revenues;" injunctive re-
lief is permissible even if it means that the defendants, in or-
F.Supp. 534 (D. Utah 1978). See also C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights 
Acts§ 317 (1980); 2 N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B. Neuborne & S. Law, Political 
and Civil Rights in the United States 608 (4th ed. 1979). But cf. Miener v. 
Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969, 977-979 (CA81982) (holding that damages may be 
recovered under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was consid-
ered to be "closely analogous" to Title VI); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 
F.Supp. 842 (D. Neb.)(dicta), aff'd without mention of remedies, 524 F. 2d 
1013 (CA8 1975); Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 FEP Cas. 1138 (C.D. Ca. 
1978)(dicta); Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 
417 F.Supp. 377 (D. D.C. 1976)(dicta). 
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der to shape their conduct to the mandate of the court's de-
cree, will have to spend more money "than if they had been 
left free to pursue their previous course of conduct." I d., at 
667-668. The key question for present purposes is whether 
the decree requires the payment of funds or grants other re-
lief, "not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the fu-
ture with a substantive federal question determination, but 
as a form of compensation" or other relief based on or flowing 
from violations at a prior time when the defendant "was un-
der no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different 
standard." I d., at 668. 
The District Court in the present case granted a number of 
relatively discrete items of relief. First, each class member 
was awarded constructive seniority, which included the right 
to: 1) "all monetary entitlements which [the class members] 
would have received had they been appointed on their con-
structive seniority date," including backpay and back medical 
and insurance benefits; and 2) all other entitlements relative 
to the award of constructive seniority, including salary, bene-
fits, and pension rights. Also, respondents were directed to 
give a sergeant's examination to those class members whose 
constructive seniority would have entitled them to take the 
last such examination. Finally, in an effort to insure that fu-
ture hiring practices would be nondiscriminatory, respon-
dents were ordered to consult with petitioners on the prepa-
ration and use of future police officer examinations for the 
next two years, and to provide petitioners with race and eth-
nicity information regarding the scores of the next scheduled 
examination. Joint App., at 99-107. 17 
On the one hand, it is obvious that the award of back pay 
and back benefits constitutes "retroactive" relief and there-
fore cannot stand. On the other hand, it is without doubt 
17 As permitted by 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the 
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that the portion of the order requiring consultation to insure 
that future examinations will not have discriminatory effects 
constitutes permissible "prospective" relief. 
This leaves the award of constructive seniority for pur-
poses of future entitlements: the right to take the special ser-
geant's exam ordered by the District Court and the right to 
an increase of salary and benefits to the level warranted by 
the constructive seniority. Because such an award affects 
only the future conduct of a defendant, it arguably could be 
categorized as permissible prospective relief. We conclude, 
however, that an award of constructive seniority, for any 
purpose whatsoever, must be deemed impermissible retroac-
tive relief. 
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 
76(H)7 (1976), we identified two types of seniority-"benefit" 
and "competitive status." The first of these, "which deter-
mines pension rights, length of vacations, size of insurance 
coverage and unemployment benefits, and the like, is analo-
gous to backpay. . . . Benefit-type seniority, like backpay, 
serves to work complete equity by penalizing the wrongdoer 
economically at the same time that it tends to make whole the 
one who was wronged." Id., at 786-787 (POWELL, J.). Its 
constructive grant "reduces the restitution required of an 
employer at such time as he is called upon to account for his 
discriminatory actions perpetrated in violation of the law." 
!d., at 767, n. 27 (opinion of the Court). Since constructive 
benefit-type seniority in this case is obviously restitutionary 
and remedial in nature, it is "a form of compensation" to 
those whose rights were violated at a time when the respon-
dents were "under no court-imposed obligation to conform to 
a different standard." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 
668. It is therefore not an aEpropriate remed,Y fQr the Title 
VJ viola1Jons alleged nere. 
Ai1 award of "competitive status" seniority likewise consti-
tutes a form of compensation for past conduct now deemed 
violative of the Act and therefore must also be considered an 
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inappropriate Title VI remedy. Competitive-type seniority 
"determines an employee's preferential rights to various eco-
nomic advantages at the expense of other employees. These 
normally include the order of layoff and recall of employees, 
job and trip assignments, and consideration for promotion." 
Franks, supra, 424 U. S., at 787 (POWELL, J.). Although 
an award of constructive seniority of this nature does not re-
sult in any increased costs to the wrongdoing employer, it 
"directly implicate[s] the rights and expectations of perfectly 
innocent employees," id., at 788, and it can only be viewed as 
compensation for a past wrong. In no respect can an award 
of competitive-type seniority be said to be "a necessary con-
sequence," Edelman, 415 U. S., at 668, of future Title VI 
compliance by the employer. Accordingly, we conclude that / 
neither an award of "bengfit" E!!r "competitive status" 
con srucbve se niority rna be obtained as a rivate ~edy 
for Title VI vio ations. 
IiiViewOfthe foregoing, it is apparent that the only proper 
Title VI relief granted by the District Court is the order di-
recting the respondents to take actions and make disclosures 
intended to insure that future hiring ,eractices will be nondis-
criminatory and valid. However, this relief is wholly sus-
tainable under the District Court's findings and conclusions 
with respect to petitioners' Title VII claim, and all members 
of the class will fully benefit from it. 18 Therefore, since a de-
cision on the merits of petitioners' Title VI claim would not in 
any way increase or decrease the measure of relief to which 
petitioners are entitled, we shall leave the question whether 
Title VI requires proof ofdiscriminafory intent for another 
day-:-- ------ -
18 Under Title VII , this type of relief can be granted unconditionally. 
Under Title VI, the defendants would have to be given the option of com-
plying or terminating participation in the federal program. See parts IV 
and V, supra. 
81-431-0PINION 
GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N.Y.C. 19 
VI:X. 
In conclusion, for the reasons expressed above, we hold 
that a private plaintiff can only recover prospective, non-
compensatory relief for a defendant's violations of Title VI. 
Such relief cannot include, for any purpose, an award of con-
structive seniority. Albeit on different grounds, the judg-
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 81-431 - Guardians Associat{on v. 
Civil Service Comm'n of the City of New York 
My vote at conference was to affirm 
unless the Title VI intentional 
discrimination issue is reached, in which 
event I would reverse. I have avoided the 
issue in this draft. 
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unless the Title VI intentional 
discrimination issue is reached, in which 
event I would reverse. I have avoided the 
issue in this draft. 
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December 20, 1982 
Re: No. 81-431 Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission of the City of New York 
Dear Byron: 
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December 27, 1982 
Re: No. 81-431, Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service 
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CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~tuU <!Jltltrl o-f tltt ~ttittb ~bdts . 
';$N'$'Irht-glltt4 ~. <If. 2ll.?)l.~ 
December 28, 1982 
Re: No. 81-431, Guardians Association v. Civil Service Comm'n 
Dear Byron: 
You have written a persuasive opinion in this case, and I have 
,given it very serious consideration. Because you have avoided the 
issue that primarily divided us at conference, namely, whether 
Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent, and now have 
based your affirmance of the judgment of the Second Circuit on 
remedial considerations, holding that compensatory relief is not 
available under Title VI, and that private cause of action relief 
under that Title is limited to declaratory and prospective injunc-
tion remedies, the opinion is almost entirely palatable to me. 
My remaining concern is the holding, p. 18, that "competitive 
status" constructive seniority is not prospective. Judge Meskill, 
however, took the position below that the order that a new ser-
geant's examination be given was prospective. 
I question only whether it is necessary now to take a position 
on competitive status constructive seniority. I say this because 
my "spies" tell me that the last time a sergeant's examination was 
given was in 1978; that the next is scheduled for January 1983; 
that at the time of the District Court's decision in February 1979 
the New York Police Department asserted that all officers previ-
ously laid off had been rehired, App. 115; and that all these 
officers are thus eligible to take the examination scheduled for 
next month. 
I therefore wonder whether competitive status constructive 
seniority is necessary at all as a matter of relief. If you would 
be willing to eliminate the holding that the competitive status 
seniority remedy is not prospective and replace it with a state-
ment that that remedial feature now is not important to this case 
and need not be analyzed further, I could join your opinion and 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
December 29, 1982 
Re: 81-431 - Guardians Association 
v. Civil Service Commission 
Dear Harry, 
As you can tell, my view is that awarding 
constructive seniority based on past transgressions is 
not just a form of prospective relief. Ordering new 
examinations for those deemed to have constructive 
senority is in the same category. 
In your words, however, I shall give "very serious 
consideration" to your suggestion that the issue need 
not be decided. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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January 4, 1983 
like your approach to this case, but I agree 
with rry that there are concerns with the holding that 
petitive status constructive seniority is not prospective 
relief. Harry has suggested that we need not take a 
position on the sergeants' examination and thereby avoid the 
problem altogether. 
I think it is a good suggestion, however, there 
were other elements of the competitive status constructive 
seniority relief which cannot be so easily resolved, for 
example, the order placing the police officers who were 
victims of the discrimination in the position on the 
seniority roster that they would have occupied but for the 
discriminatory examinations. That form of relief may well 
be characterized as altering their employment status for the 
future. 
For the present I will wait to see what changes 





MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 81-431 
Attached is a proposed letter to Justice White in this case. 
I would suggest, however, that there may not be any point in 
s~ng such~ lett,: r. J ~ , 
Justice White now has four votes to hold that all construe-
tive seniority is retroactive relief: his own vote, plus LFP, 
Chief, and WHR. He also appears to have the votes of HAB and SOC 
for everything in the opinion except the competitive status con-
structive seniority issue. 
The problem is this: if BRW cannot get a fifth vote on the 
constructive seniority issue, it means that five members of the 
Court will hold that some portion of the relief in this case is 
prospective. That in turn means those five Justices must decide 
whether that portion of the relief was justified -- in other 
words, those five Justices must reach the intent/effect issue 
under Title VI. This would be a messy resolution. 
It seems to me that if there is a reasonable way for BRW to 
avoid the competitive status issue, and thus get HAB and SOC, the 
result would be a clear and firm vindication of your view on the 
major issue in the case: the existence of a private damages ac-
tion under Title VI. Accordingly, I am not sure there is any 
point in trying to persuade BRW to reject HAB' s suggestion of 
avoiding the competitive status issue. If in fact there is no 
' ..... ~, ·~ 
2. 
way to avoid it -- and I think that probably is the case then 
BRW will have to say so, and the other five Justices will have to 
decide whether to join BRW. But it might be best simply to leave 
it to BRW to decide whether or not the competitive status issue 
can be avoided. 
'· 
3. 
Draft Letter to Justice White 
Dear Byron: 
I write to comment briefly on the letters from Harry and 
Sandra concerning the possibility that your opinion need not 
reach the issue of whether cornpeti tive status constructive se-
niority constitutes prospective or retrospective relief. 
It is desirable, of course, to avoid deciding issues unnec-
essarily. I am inclined to agree with Sandra, however, that the 
competitive status seniority relief in this case extends beyond 
the entitlement to take a sergeant's examination. For example, 
as Sandra suggests, the award of constructive seniority will af-
feet the seniority lists used for purposes of layoffs. See J.A. 
at Al06. This portion of the relief will not be mooted by the 
upcoming sergeant's exam. 
On the merits, I continue to agree with your conclusion that 
any grant of constructive seniority -- whether "benefit" or "corn-
petitive status" -- constitutes compensation for a past wrong. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:prtmt <!Jcttri d tltt ~ttb' .:%hrlt.9' 
~agJringhtn. ~.<!f. 202~~ 
\ 
January 13, 1983 
Re: 81-431 -Guardians Ass'n v. Civil 
Service Comm'n 
Dear Byron: 
With apologies for not responding to your 
circulation more promptly, I can now state that I 
intend to write separately and will probably come to 
the conclusion that there is a remedy, either in 
accord with the analysis in Cannon, or under §1983, 
that the statute as construed by the majority in 
Bakke requires proof of intent, but that the 
regulation is nevertheless valid. Some of this may 
change in the writing, but I am sure that I will not 
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C HAMBERS or 
JU STI CE S ANDRA DAY O ' CONNOR 
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~!Ufltingtl.ln,lfl. <!f. 20~J!.~ 
March 14, 1983 
Re: No. 81-431, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n 
Dear Byron, 
I have reviewed all the circulating opinions in this 
case, including the proposed dissent circulated by Thurgood 
today, and have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I 
cannot agree with any of them entirely. 
In an earlier letter, I indicated that I was troubled 
by your treatment of the issue of the kinds of relief 
available to enforce spending clause legislation in a 
private cause of action. I share John Stevens' view, as 
expressed in Part I of his proposed dissent, that Pennhurst 
does not compel a conclusion that only prospective relief is 
available. Therefore, I cannot join your proposed opinion 
as it now stands. 
As I expressed at conference, I would recognize a 
private cause of action under Title VI. On the merits 
1 
issue, however, I feel constrained, because of stare decisis 
concerns, to conclude that Bakke is controlling and that 
proof of intentional discrimination is required to make out 
a case un~itfe'V! . G1ven thi s s t a t utory s tandard, I am 
unable to say that regulations that impose a 'mpact 
standard can be upheld as reasonably re ed to the statute. 
Therefore, although I could concur in a j~grne~t ~.~SW 
the decision below, I cannot otherwis join your o 1nion. 
Therefore, as things now stand, I wou~ write separately 
express my own views on the case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 14, 1983 
AND JUSTICES BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, AND O'CONNOR 
Re: 81-431 - Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n 
It may be well to review the status of this case, in which I 
shall shortly recirculate. I hope to clarify the basis for 
affirmance in this case which is this: Unless Congress clearly 
indicates to the contrary, one way or another, a typical spending-
clause statute should be construed as extending to private parties 
only the right • to secure an injunction ordering compliance, from that 
date forward, with the terms on which federal funds have been 
furnished. Thus, in a §1983 suit against state officials, the only 
remedy is the enforcement~~e-~future compliance. 
To say that prospective, but not retrospective, relief is 
available is thus not wholly accurate, and the first draft perhaps 
was misleading in this respect. What private plaintiffs can get is a 
declaration of what compliance requires and an order to comply. This 
includes no individual or class relief, prospective or not, for past 
conduct by the grantee that was inconsistent with the grant. 
The Chief Justice, Lewis and Bill Rehnquist have joined the 
first draft and thus agree that this approach forecloses any of the 
relief that must rest on Title VI in this case, including competitive 
seniority. Harry and Sandra have expressed their doubts about 
competitive seniority on the ground that it is prospective only. 
Harry has suggested that it need not be dealt with at all because of 
impending sergeant's examinations that in the circumstances would 
solve the competitive seniority issue completely. Unfortunately, I 
have been unable to verify that this is the case. 
If the approach of the circulating draft does not carry the day 
with respect to competitive seniority, it will be necessary to 
confront the issue of whether intentional discrimination must be 
shown in a Title VI case. In that event, there would be no need to 
pursue the cause-of-action approach of the current draft. Of course, 
the intent issue is a recurring question, and it may be well to 
settle it. As you know, John has now written on the matter, 
concluding that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
March 15, 1983 
Re: 81-431 - Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Service Comm'n 
Dear Chief, 
In view of the various writings in this 
case and Sandra's letter of today, perhaps we 
should chat on Friday about whether the 
opinion should be reassigned. 
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From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ___ NIIR __ 2_4_'83---=----- ~. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-431 
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
dissenting. 
It is not an easy task to harmonize the Court's cases under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 78 Stat. 
252, 42 U. S.C. §2000d et seq. Unless the Court is tore-
pudiate what it has already written, however, I believe the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. I reach 
this conclusion by answering three separate questions: (1) 
whether federal law authorizes private individuals to recover 
damages for injuries caused by violations of Title VI and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder; (2) if so, whether Title 
VI requires recipients of federal funds to do any more than 
refrain from engaging in conduct that would, if performed by 
a state, violate the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) if not, 
whether an administrative agency may validly impose addi-
tional requirements on recipients of funds from that agency. 
I shall discuss each question in turn. 
I 
As the plurality notes, ante, at 8, in the last five years at ~ 
least eight Members of this Court have endorsed the view 
that Title VI , as well as the comparable provisio of Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, may enforced in a 
Jf ~tW~~-
MJV'VW'-~· ~ !3/--W J ~-· ... ,I f.. :JtJ. d -<47ft.;/ 
~ ~-;& ~ l!C;a -P, 
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private action against recipients of federal funds, such as the 
respondent in this case. 1 This Court has authorized relief in 
at least four such cases. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 
(1974); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284 (1976); Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979). 
The plurality today holds that a plaintiff who prevails in a \ 
suit under Title VI is entitled only to a limited form of pro-
spective relief. 2 That holding is somewhat surprising, since 
no Member of the Court in Lau, Bakke, or Cannon men-
tioned such a limitation on remedies. Presumably, the con-
clusion rests on a finding that Congress, in enacting Title VI, 
intended to distinguish between prospective and retroactive 
relief. Yet it seems to me most improbable that Congress 
contemplated · so significant and unusual a limitation on the 
forms of relief available to a victim of racial discrimination, 
but said absolutely nothing about it in the text of the statute. 
It is one thing to believe, as I do, that the 1964 Congress, 
1 Six Members of the Court-CHIEF JuSTICE BURGER, JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, Justice Stewart, JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and Jus-
TICE STEVENs-endorsed the view that a private right of action exists di-
rectly under Title VI and Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U. S. 677 (1977); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265, 418-421 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Two Members of the 
Court-JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN-endorsed the view that 
private individuals may enforce Title VI and Title IX against appropriate 
defendants under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Cannon, supra, at 722-724 (WHITE, 
J., dissenting). 
2 The plurality would prohibit any "form of compensation or relief based 
on past conduct now deemed violative of the Act." Ante, at 17. As a gen-
eral matter, this prohibition would remove the incentive for virtually all 
private litigation: The purpose of any lawsuit is to obtain compensation or 
relief based on past illegal conduct. More concretely, the plurality's spe-
cific conclusion-that an award of "competitive status" seniority is imper-
missible-cannot be reconciled with the square holdings in Bakke and Can-
non that Title VI and Title IX respectively authorized an injunction 
requiring admission to a university's medical school based on proof of past 
unlawful discrimination. 
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legislating when implied causes of action were the rule rather 
than the exception, reasonably assumed that the intended 
beneficiaries of Title VI would be able to vindicate their 
rights in court. It is quite another thing to believe that the 
1964 Congress substantially qualified that assumption but 
thought it unnecessary to tell the Judiciary about the 
qualification. 
In order to reach its creative conclusion about the scope of 
available relief under Title VI, the plurality relies heavily on 
the proposition that Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 
451 U. S. 1 (1981), establishes a "presumption that only lim-
ited injunctive relief should be granted as a remedy for viola-
tions of statutes passed pursuant to the spending power." 
Ante, at 14. That characterization seriously distorts the 
opinion of the Court in Pennhurst, which concerned the ex-
istence or nonexistence of statutory rights, not remedies. 3 
We held that Congress will not be presumed to have created 
substantive legal obligations under the Spendjng Power by 
legislation so ambiguous that "a State is unaware of the con-
ditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it." I d., 
at 17.4 In dictum, 5 we went on to speculate that an injunc-
3 We framed our opinion as follows: 
"Petitioners first contend that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 does not create in favor of 
the mentally retarded any substantive rights to 'appropriate treatment' in 
the 'least restrictive' environment. Assuming that Congress did intend to 
create such a right, petitioners question the authority of Congress to im-
pose these affirmative obligations on the States under either its spending 
power or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners next assert that 
any rights created by the Act are enforceable in federal court only by the 
Federal Government, not by private parties. Finally, petitioners argue 
that the court below read the scope of any rights created by the Act too 
broadly and far exceeded its remedial powers in requiring the Common-
wealth to move its residents to less restrictive environments and create in-
dividual habilitation plans for the mentally retarded. Because we agree 
with petitioners' first contention-that § 6010 simply does not create sub-
stantive rights-we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues." 
451 U. S., at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
'Obviously, there can be no argument that the respondent in this case 
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tion requiring a State to provide "'appropriate' treatment in 
the 'least restrictive' environment" might be improper, not-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts 
from requiring states to pay money damages. I d., at 29-30. 
Without explaining why, the plurality today divines a general 
principle of statutory interpretation from this discussion of 
the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment obvi-
ously has no relevance in most Title VI litigation; it certainly 
is not implicated in this suit against the City of New York. I 
cannot fathom the plurality's supposition that Congress regu-
larly analogizes to the Eleventh Amendment when it drafts 
Spending Power legislation. There is certainly nothing in 
the text or the legislative history of Title VI to suggest that 
the 1964 Congress did so. 
Even if it were not settled by now that Title VI authorizes 
appropriate relief, both prospective and retroactive, to vic-
tims of racial discrimination at the hands of recipients of fed-
eral funds, the same result would follow in this case because 
the petitioners have' sought relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 
While Title VI applies to all recipients of federal funds, § 1983 
governs a different class of persons: those who act "under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory." Our past decisions establish that 
the respondent in this case, the Civil Service Commission of 
the City of New York, is bound by§ 1983 as well as by Title 
VI. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 
(1978). Our past decisions also establish that § 1983 provides 
a damages remedy. Ibid. And finally, it is clear that the 
was unaware of its obligations. Both the statute and the regulations 
clearly prohibit racial discrimination, and they did so at the time the re-
spondent accepted the federal money. 
6 After the sentence fragment quoted ante, at 10-11, the Court con-
cluded, "These are all difficult questions. Because the Court of Appeals 
has not addressed these issues, however, we remand the issues for consid-
eration in light of our decision here." Id. , at 30. 
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§ 1983 remedy is intended to redress the deprivation of rights 
secured by all valid federal laws, including statutes and regu-
lations having the force of law. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U. S. 1 (1980). 6 See also Cannon, supra, at 722-724 
(WHITE, J., dissenting); ante, at 8. Yet the plurality opinion 
today nowhere explains why § 1983 does not authorize the re-
lief that the district court granted to the petitioners. 
The policy arguments the plurality advances in support of 
its holding may be perfectly sound. There may well be situ-
ations in which one would fear that strict retroactive enforce-
ment of a federal grant condition would discourage grant 
applications that are a high federal priority. 7 These are, 
however, arguments that should be addressed to Congress 
rather than to a court. Cf. Cannon, supra, at 709-710. I 
believe Congress implicitly authorized the Federal Judiciary 
to award appropriate relief to private parties injured by vi-
olations of Title VI. Whether these petitioners are within 
that special class is, of course, another question to which I 
now turn. 
II 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265,412-418 (1978), four Justices expressed the opinion 
that Title VI's prohibition against racial discrimination is sig-
nificantly broader than the protection provided by the Equal 
6 Thiboutot itself involved only federal statutes, not regulations. Its 
analysis of § 1983, however, applies equally to administrative regulations 
having the force of law. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 
301-303 (1979) (discussing what types of administrative regulations have 
"the force and effect of law"). 
7 I must point out, however, that the record in this case gives no basis 
for thinking that the cost of an appropriate award of damages to the peti-
tioners would exceed the total amount of respondent's federal subsidy. 
And, as a general proposition, it is usually assumed that a cutoff of federal 
funds would be significantly more drastic than an individualized remedy for 
the victim of a Title VI violation. See Cannon, supra, at 705, and n. 38. 
l· 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That po-
sition was a dissenting one, however; five Members of the 
Court unequivocally rejected it. 
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Jus-
TICE POWELL reviewed the legislative history of Title VI and 
concluded: 
"In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must 
be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment." 438 U. S., at 287. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, 
and JusTICE BLACKMUN reached the same conclusion. They 
wrote: 
"In our view, Title VI prohibits only those uses of ra-
cial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if employed by a State or its agencies. . .. " I d., 
at 328.8 
Later in their opinion, they summarized the reasoning that 
led them to that conclusion: 
"Congress' equating of Title VI's prohibition with the 
commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its 
refusal precisely to define that racial discrimination 
which it intended to prohibit, and its expectation that 
the statute would be administered in a flexible manner, 
compel the conclusion that Congress intended the mean-
ing of the statute's prohibition to evolve with the inter-
pretation of the commands of the Constitution." I d., at 
340. 9 
8 Accord, id. , at 332, 333, 334, n. 11, 336, 338. Towards the end of their 
opinion, JUSTICES BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN ex-
pressly considered and rejected the argument that the Court's earlier deci-
sion in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), foreclosed their reading of 
Title VI. See 438 U. S., at 352-353. 
9 0f course. in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), the Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only by purposeful state racial 
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The interpretation of Title VI adopted by a majority in 
Bakke was confirmed in two subsequent opinions of the 
Court. In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 206, n. 6 
(1979), the Court distinguished Title VII from Title VI on the 
basis that the former provision "was not intended to incorpo-
rate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 10 And in Board of Education, New 
York City v. Harris, 444 U. S. 130 (1979), the Court first 
concluded that the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 
86 Stat. 354, contemplates funding cutoffs in response to 
forms of discrimination that are not "discrimination in the 
Fourteenth Amendment sense." Id., at 149. The Court 
then went on, in considered dictum, to distinguish the ESAA 
from Title VI: 
"A violation of Title VI may result in a cutoff of all fed-
eral funds, and it is likely that Congress would wish this 
drastic result only when discrimination is intentional. 
In contrast, only ESAA funds are rendered unavailable 
when an ESAA violation is found." I d., a 150. u 
discrimination. 
10 The Court explained: 
"Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered in University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), contains no provision 
comparable to§ 703(j) [of Title VII]. This is because Title VI was an exer-
cise of federal power over a matter in which the Federal Government was 
already directly involved: the prohibitions against race-based conduct con-
tained in Title VI governed 'program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.' 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Congress was legislating to as-
sure federal funds would not be used in an improper manner. Title VII, 
by contrast, was enacted pursuant to the commerce power to regulate 
purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to incorporate and 
particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Title VII and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari materia.'' 443 
U. S., at 206, n. 6. 
11 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by JUSTICES POWELL 
and REHNQUIST, also noted that Title VI "has been construed to contain 
not a mere disparate impact standard, but a standard of intentional dis-
crimination.'' 444 U. S., at 159-160. 
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The question to be decided today is not whether the Court 
has misread the actual intent of the Congress that enacted 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For when the Court unequivo-
cally rejects one reading of a statute, its action should be re-
spected in future litigation. Compare United States v. 
Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110, 
140-150 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), with Dougherty 
County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 47 (1978) 
((STEVENS, J., concurring) and City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U. S. 156, 191 (1980) ((STEVENS, J., concurring). 
See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 189-192 (1976) 
((STEVENS, J., concurring). If a statute is to be amended 
after it has been authoritatively construed by this Court, that 
task should almost always be performed by Congress. 12 
Title VI must therefore mean what this Court has said it 
means, regardless of what some of us may have thought it 
meant before this Court spoke. Today, proof of invidious 
purpose is a necessary component of a valid Title VI claim. 
III 
The respondent in this case sought, received, and ex-
12 Like most, this proposition of law is not wholly without exceptions. 
Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms, expect-
ing the federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-
by-case basis in the common law tradition. One clear example of such a 
statute is the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209. See National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 687-688 (1978); Associ-
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters,-- U. S. --, -- (1983). For that reason, in Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the doctrine of stare deci-
sis did not preclude the Court from overruling its prior decision in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967), even though Con-
gress had not acted during the intervening decade. Cf. M on nell v. De-
partment of Social Services , 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (overruling an 
erroneous interpretation of§ 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), 
despite the absence of congressional action). Title VI is different from 
those statutes, because Congress expected most interstitial lawmaking to 
be performed by administrative agencies, not courts. 
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pended federal grants to pay the salaries of policemen and to 
finance its recruitment programs. In order to obtain funds 
from the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice, 
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, see 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A123, it was required to promise not 
only that it would comply with Title VI, but also that it would 
abide by departmental regulations implementing that stat-
ute. 13 Ever since 1964, all three Departments have had vir-
tually identical implementing regulations. Significantly, 
those regulations do more than merely prohibit grant recipi-
ents from administering the funds with a discriminatory pur-
pose; they require recipients to administer the grants in a 
manner that has no racially discriminatory effects. 14 
This Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of those 
regulations and their "effects" standard. Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U. S., at 568; id., at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring); 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 479 (1980) (Opinion of 
BURGER, C. J.). The reason is that Title VI explicitly au-
thorizes "[e]ach Federal department and agency which is em-
13 One standard application form requires the following certification": 
"The grantee hereby assures and certifies that it will comply with the regu-
lations, policies, guidelines and requirements with respect to the accept-
ance and use of Federal funds for this federally-assisted program. Also, 
the grantee gives assurances and certifies with respect to the grant that: 
(6) The grant will be conducted and administered in compliance with: 
(a) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88--352) and imple-
menting regulations .... " Form HUD 4124 (emphasis added). 
"For example, the regulations provide: 
"A recipient, in determining the ... benefits ... which will be provided 
under any such program, ... may not, directly or through contractual or 
other arrangements, utilize criteria which ... have the effect of defeating 
or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program 
as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." 24 
CFR § 1.4(b)(2) (1982); 28 CFR § 42.104(b)(2) (1982); 29 CFR § 31.3(b)(2) 
(1982). 
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powered to extend Federal financial assistance ... to effec-
tuate the provisions of section 601 . . . by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be 
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute 
authorizing the financial assistance . . . . " 78 Stat. 252, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000d-1. Nothing in the regulations is inconsis-
tent with any of the statutes authorizing the disbursement of 
the grants that the respondent received. 15 
It is well settled that when Congress explicitly authorizes 
an administrative agency to promulgate regulations imple-
menting a federal statute that governs completely private 
conduct, those regulations have the force of law so long as 
they are "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation." Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 
Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973). See also Chrysler Corp . v. 
Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 301-306 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 
432 U. S. 416, 425, n. 9 (1977). See generally K. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise§ 7.8 (2d ed. 1980 and Supp. 1982). 
The presumption of validity must be at least as strong when a 
regulation does not seek to control the conduct of independ-
ent private parties, but merely defines the terms on which 
someone may seek federal money. By prohibiting grant re-
cipients from adopting procedures that deny program bene-
fits to members of any racial group, the administrative agen-
cies have acted in a reasonable manner to further the 
purposes of Title VI. 16 The reasonableness of the agencies' 
method of implementation is apparent from the Court's opin-
ion in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173-178 
" Indeed, even in the absence of Title VI, one would expect the adminis-
trative agencies to distribute the grants in a way that will benefit all seg-
ments of the communities they seek to serve. 
16 Those purposes are evident from the statutory language: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in [or] be denied the benefits 
of .. . any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 78 
Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. 
''· 
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(1980), which held that even if § 1 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment only prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in vot-
ing, Congress may implement that prohibition by banning 
voting practices that are discriminatory in effect. Thus, al-
though the petitioners had to prove that the respondents' ac-
tions were motivated by an invidious intent in order to prove 
a violation of the statute, they only had to show that there-
spondents' actions were producing discriminatory effects in 
order to prove a violation of valid federal law. 
IV 
The District Court found that the respondent in this case 
was making entry-level appointments to the police depart-
ment in a manner that had a discriminatory impact on blacks 
and Hispanics. That conduct violated the petitioners' rights 
under regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor, 
the Department of Justice, and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. The petitioners were therefore 
entitled to the compensation they sought under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 and were awarded by the District Court. I would re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
1st DRAFT 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-431 
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
For the reasons given in Part I of the dissent by JUSTICE 
STEVENS, post, at 1-4, I cannot agree with the limitations 
that the plurality opinion would place on the s~e _o~ita­
ble relief available to private litigants suing unaer"Tiffe VI. 
Tnerefore, like the dissent, I would address two further 
questions: (1) whether proof of purposeful discrimination is a 
necessary element of a valid Title VI claim, and (2) if so, 
whether administrative regulations incorporating an impact 
standard may be upheld as within the agency's statutory au-
thority. My affirmative answer to the first question leads 
me to conclude that regulations imposing an impact standard 
are not valid. On that basis, I would affirm the judgment 
below. 
Were we construing Title VI without the benefit of any 
prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude 
that the statute was designed to redress more than purpose-
ful discrimination. Cf. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 412-418 (1978) (opinion of STE-
VENS, J.). In Bakke, however, a majority of the Court 
concluded otherwise. ld., at 287 (opinion of POWELL, J.); 
id., at 328 (opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by WHITE, MAR-
SHALL, and BLACKMUN, "JJ.). Like JUSTICE STEVENS, post, 
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at 8, I feel constrained by stare decisis to follow that inter-
pretation of the statute. 
I part company with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, however, 
when it concludes that administrative regulations incorporat-
ing an "effects" standard may be upheld notwithstanding the 
statute's proscription of intentional discrimination only. See 
post, at 8-11. Administrative regulations having the force of 
law may be set aside only if they exceed the statutory author-
ity of the agency or are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Batterton 
v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 426 (1977). JUSTICE STEVENS' 
dissent argues that agency regulations incorporating an "ef-
fects" standard reflect a reasonable method of "further[ing] 
the purposes of Title VI." Post, at 10. If, as five members 
of the Court concluded in Bakke, the purpose of Title VI is to 
proscribe only purposeful discrimination in a program receiv-
ing federal financial assistance, it is difficult to fathom how 
the Court could uphold administrative regulations that would 
proscribe conduct by the recipient having only a discrimina-
tory effect. Such regulations do not simply "further" the 
purpose of Title VI; they go well beyond that purpose. 
The Court's decision in City of Rome v. United States, 446 
U. S. 156 (1980), does not persuade me to the contrary. The 
challenge there was to the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute that imposed a stricter standard of nondiscrimination 
than that required by the constitutional provision pursuant to 
which the statute was enacted. Specifically, the Court held 
that, under the enabling authority in § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, Congress may enact a statute banning voting 
practices having a discriminatory effect, even if § 1 of the 
Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in vot-
ing. I d., at 178. The Court reasoned that Congress' power 
under § 2 of the Amendment is "no less broad than its author-
ity under the Necessary and Proper Clause." I d., at 175. 
Therefore, as long as the statute was an appropriate means of 
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition, the stat-
ute was valid. 
Si-846-CONCUR 
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The breadth of authority granted to Congress under the 
enabling provision of the Fifteenth Amendment is not equiva-
lent to the amount of discretion that an administrative 
agency possesses in implementing the provisions of a federal 
statute. An administrative agency is itself a creature of 
statute. Although the Court has stated that an agency's leg-
islative regulations will be upheld if they are "reasonably re-
lated" to the purposes of the enabling statute, Mourning v. 
Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973), 
we would expand considerably the discretion and power of 
agencies were we to interpret "reasonably related" to permit 
agencies to proscribe conduct that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit. "Reasonably related to" simply cannot mean "in-
consistent with." Yet that would be the effect of upholding 
the administrative regulations at issue in this case if, as five 
Justices concluded in Bakke, the expressed will of Congress 
is that federal funds recipients are prohibited only from pur-
posefully discriminating on the grounds on race, color, or na-
tional origin in the administration of funded programs. 
I acknowledge that in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1973), 
the Court approved liability under Title VI for conduct hav-
ing only a discriminatory impact. Nevertheless, I believe 
that JUSTICE BRENNAN accurately observed in Bakke, 438 
U. S., at 352, that Bakke's interpretation of "Title VI's defi-
nition of racial discrimination to be absolutely coextensive 
with the Constitution's" casts serious doubt on the correct-
ness of the Lau decision. In my view, the logical implica-
tions of that interpretation require that Lau be overruled. 
Accordingly, I would conclude that the Title VI regulations 
at issue here cannot validly serve as the basis for liability. 
Because petitioners have failed to prove intentional dis-





81-431 Guardian Association v. rivil Service Comm'n 
Dear Sandra: 
, Although I am with Byron in his plurality opinion, 
I have read with interest and admiration your opinion con-
curring in the judgment. 
L• One of the serious problemq ~ith the way our gov-
ernment operates is that departments and aqenries, when au-
thorized to adopt rules and requlations, almnst invariably 
use this authority to expand their jurisniction. We have an 
example of. it in the recent case involvinq lOb-5 of the se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. 'l'he SE~ is one of our bettet" 
agencies, and yet it has e-xpanded vastly its jurisdiction 
over the intervening vears - accomplished in mRior part bv 
anonymous staff personnel who write and then construe the 
regulations .~ , . ., , , . ... ,, ~-
~r ~ '-~- "'. .. ~r~ ·.~..;.. 
.1i .;~ 
,John 'r:~ view would substantially,• enhance ;:. the power 
of this larqety "invisible" qoverm"lent. ' 'Rut quite apart 
from broader concerns, you answer his legal Argument in one 
sentence: "Reasonably ~r.~1ated to" ~imply cannot .!(l~~n .-~in-
consi .. stent with". , ·~i~· . : ,., .. , AA , , , 
,(,.,~\~.-~ .,._, 
I hope that your opinion will 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
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~~ ~. cq. 20[3~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 1, 1983 
Re: 81-431 - Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission of the City of New York 
As the votes on the presently circulating opinions stack up, 
there are five to affirm, four on my opinion because the 
additional remedy sought by the plaintiffs is not available under 
Title VI and one, Sandra, on the ground that the Court of Appeals 
was right in concluding that it is necessary to prove intentional 
discrimination to recover under Title VI. Of course, there are 
four to reverse; for them the Court of Appeals was wrong on the 
intent issue and I am wrong on the remedy issue. 
If the judgment is affirmed based on the present opinions, 
that judgment will rest on two positions, both of which are 
rejected by a majority of the Court: my view with respect to the 
limitations on equitable relief is rejected by the four who would 
reverse and by Sandra who would affirm; Sandra's view is rejected 
by the four who would reverse and by myself. Of course, my view 
on the intent issue is not revealed in the present opinions, but 
it was my position at conference and I adhere to it. Hence, to 
the extent that affirmance on the present opinions would signal 
that intent is a necessary element in a Title VI case, that 
signal would be a false indication of the views of the present 
Members of the Court. 
No doubt this sort of thing has happened bef~, but I think 
it undesirable, the false signal in particular. That element is 
curable by my expressing myself on the iljtent issue. I shall 
accordingly recirculate, reaching and Vdeciding the intent 
question and then going on much as I now do to say that in my 
opinion the relief sought is unavailable here, at least in the 
absence of a showing of intentional discrimination. 
Of course, I shall circulate as announcing the judgment, and 
it may work out that someone else will inherit that job. 
G_l. PtV'~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I write separately. The many 
opinions filed in this case draw lines that are not 
required by, and indeed in some instances seem 
~ 
incompatible with, our prior decisions. One may doubt 
1\ 
~ 
whether our opinions will be helpful in affording 
1 
guidance. 1 
1In particular, the Court is~~~~ ee the 
standard of proof required to prove violations of rights 
in cases involving Title VI. Seven Members of the Court 
agree that a violation of the statute itself requires 
proof of discriminatory intent. See post, at 1-2 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment): post, at 9 
(STEVENS, J., joined by BRENNAN and BLACKMON, JJ.) 
("Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary 
component of a valid Title VI claim"). Only JUSTICE WHITE 
and JUSTICE MARSHALL believe that a violation of Title VI 
may be established by proof of discriminatory effect, and 
JUSTICE WHITE would recognize only limited prospective 
relief for such a violation. See ante, at 21. JUSTICES 
BRENNAN, BLACKMON, and STEVENS, however, believe that a 




·:~~~~;~ ·~,. ., . 
2. 
I 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 730 
{1979) {POWELL, J., dissenting), I would have held that 
Congress intended no implied private right of action under 
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. For the same general 
reasons, I also would hold that petitioners may not 
maintain this action under Title VI. 
violation of the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI 
may be established by proof of discriminatory impact. See 
post, at 12. 
Thus, a majority of the Court holds that proof of 
discriminatory effect will suffice to establish liability 
only when the suit is brought pursuant to the regulations 
rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that 
the regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 
42 u.s.c. §1983: anyone invoking the implied right of 
action under Title VI would be limited by the 
discriminatory intent standard required to prove 
violations of Title VI. Thus, the apparent result is that 
a suit against governmental recipients of federal funds--
who may be sued under §1983--will be governed by a 
different standard of liability than a suit against 
private fund recipients. One would have difficulty 
explaining this result in terms of the legislative history 






Congress, for reasons of its own, all 
~ 
elects to remain silent on the right-of-action question. 
1\~~~ 
The result frequently is uncertainty/\as to available 
remedies, leaving the courts to provide ~· We 
~
have recognized f hat whether a private right of action may 
be implied requires a determination of congressional 
e..1 , 
intent. See!{ Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. ~, 
SG.I fJJZ. ~~bf~, k U<R~~~~ 
l+i {1979) · ~ ~ particula~ to what other remedies ~ 
have been provided. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 u.s. 11, 19 {1979) {"it is an elemental 
canon of statutory construction that where a statute 
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading others into it"). 
The legislative history of Title VI is replete with 




taxpayers' money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, 
at 16-17 (WHITE, J.). In accord with this purpose, 
Congress expressly provided for perhaps the most effective 
of all remedies in a federal funding statute: the cutting 
off of funds. 2 In addition, it created a carefully 
constructed administrative procedure to insure that such 
withholding of funds was required only where appropriate. 
2JUSTICE MARSHALL argues that private relief must 
be available because the statutory remedy of a fund cut-
off is "impractical" and "too Draconian to be widely 
used." Post, at 4-5 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 
5, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In my view, such 
reasoning evinces a ~ea~ departure from the principle 
--~«..:e,--,~~S-L~ti ve intent is the guide to implying a right 
of action. Th "udiciary is not free to decide that 
remedies affirmative y and expressly adopted by Congress 
are so "impractical" that judicially-created remedies are 
necessary. Rather, the fact that Congress expressly 
adopted one remedy--and one only--should be viewed as a 
congressional choice that should be obeyed. See Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 749 (1979) (POWELL, 
J., dissenting) ("Where a statutory scheme expressly 
provides for an alternative mechanism for enforcing the 
rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant 
ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services 
for enforcement purposes."). 
l •, 
5. 
In light of these factors, I do not believe that Congress 
intended to authorize private suits but failed to do so 
through some inadvertance. See also Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 381 
(1978} (WHITE, J.} (" [T] here is no express provision for 
private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be quite 
incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to 
the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, 
intended silently to create a private cause of action to 
enforce Title VI"}. 3 I would affirm the judgment below 
/J.J~~~~~ 
3I also would hold that pri ate actions asserting 
violations of Title VI may not be rought under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. Congress' creation of an xpress administrative 
procedure for remedying violations aemliRaelil me that it 
did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately 
either under the statute itself or under §1983. See 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn. , 453 u.S. 1, 20-21 (1981} : cf. Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980} (POWELL, J., 
dissenting} ("The only exception [to §1983 liability] will 
be in cases where the governing statute provides an 
Footnote continued on next page. 




solely on this issue. 
II 
'~/ 
There is~an alternative ground for affirmance. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
respondents had failed to show any intentional 
discrimination. The Court of Appeals, relying on the 
opinions in Bakke, held that such a showing--one that must 
be made to establish an equal protection claim--is a 
prerequisite to a successful Title VI claim. I agree with 
Justice Stevens, post, at 6-9, that the Court of Appeals 
~~~ 
was correct in its reading of Bakke • 
.-'\. 
My conclusion in Bakke was that "[i]n view of the 
clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to 






proscribe only those racial classifications that would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment." 438 U.S., at 284-287. JUSTICES BRENNAN, A 
:-tt:;::::;!J r~ 
WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN undertookS aR even mo~e 
~ analysis of the legislative history in reaching 
~
the same conclusion. See id., at 328-340. The~~press~ 
,, 
~that Title VI's definition of racial 
'\ 
discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the 
Constitution's." Id., at 354. This construction 
~!~i:q 
necessarily requires rejection of the prior analysis in 
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973), that discriminatory 
impact suffices to establish liability under Title VI. 4 
4The Lau Court d · d not undertake any analysis of 
the legislative history of Title VI • .<'\ I have no occasion 
to consider whether the resu t in Lau may stand 
despite rejection of its 
H. 
petitioners had failed to establish their Title VI 
claims. 5 
For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
5For the reasons stated by JUST CE O'CONNOR, post, 
at 2-4, I reject JUSTICE STEVENS' nov 1 argument that an 
administrative agency is free to adopt ny regulation that 
may be said to further the purpose of an enabling 
statute. Administrative agencies have o such lawmaking 
power. 
JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE MARSHALL would avoid the 
c3::etn: reasoning of Bakke by deferring to a prior 
administrative construction of Title VI. See ante, at 9-
10 {opinion of WHITE, J.); post, at 14-20 {MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting) • I am il'l ful~ ag~Qement with the !'r iReiple ~ 
that the Court will "sustai[n] a reasonable administrative 
interpretation even if we would have reached a different 
result had the question initially arisen in a judicial 
proceeding." Post, at 18 {MARSHALL, J., dissenting). ~-()' 
fetil to -.UR.de~;stal+Q r RoWQVet:, bow -this pc ine:iple can be "d--
~a~plied after this Court alreag¥ has issued a definitive--
and contrary--construction of its own. Moreover, in Bakke 
JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE MARSHALL agreed that "[n] owhere 
is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended to 
terminate federal funding for any reason other than 
consideration of race or national origin by the recipient 
institution in a manner inconsistent with the standards 
inco~porated in the Constitution." 438 U.S., at 322 
{opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMON, JJ.). 
If "nowhere" is there any evidence that Congress intended 
the Title VI standard to differ from the constitutional 
standard, t;.fte.Rt n agency interpretation to the contrary 
is enti led to no deference. 
~ 
.... 
.Jl.JN l S ·.~ ~~ 







From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ----------
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-431 
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I write separately. The many opinions 
filed in this case draw lines that are not required by, and in-
deed in some instances seem incompatible with, our prior de-
cisions. A O:ne msy ~,~:ethir etJ.r Q.Piffi.Qus; teElay will 
be)lelpWl m afforElmg-guKumee) 
' In particular, the Court is divided as to the standard of proof required 
to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI. Seven Members 
of the Court agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of 
discriminatory intent. See post, at 1-2 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the 
judgment); post, at 9 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN and 
BLACKMUN, JJ.) ("Today, proof of inYidious purpose is a necessary compo-
nent of a valid Title VI claim"). Only JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL believe that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of 
discriminatory effect, and JUSTICE WHITE would recognize only non-
compen atory, prospective relief for uch a violation. See ante, at 21. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMCN, and JUSTICE STEVENS, how-
ever, believe that a violation of the l'egulations adopted pursuant to Title 
VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact. See post, at 12. 
Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory ef-~ 1 feet uffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce 
the regulations rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that the • 
regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. ~ 1983; 
anyone invoking the implied right of action under Title VI would be limited 
by the discriminatory intent standard required to prove violations of Title 
·~ ·'. 
81-431-CONCUR 
2 GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N. Y. C. 
I 
In Cannon v. UniveTsity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730 
(1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting), I would have held that Con-
gress intended no implied private right of action under Title 
IX of the Civil Rights Act. For the same general reasons, I 
also would hold that petitioners may not maintain this action 
under Title VI. 
Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to 
remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The 
result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available 
remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without 
clear legislative guidance. We have recognized repeatedly 
that whether a private right of action may be implied re-
quires a determination of congressional intent. See, e. g., 
Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look, of course, to the legislative history and 
in particular to what other remedies have been provided. 
See TTansameTica MoTtgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11, 19 (1979) ("it is an elemental canon of statutory con-
struction that where a statute expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others 
into it"). 
The legislative history of Title VI is replete with refer-
ences to the Act's central purpose of ensuring that taxpayers' 
money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, at 17 (opin-
ion ofWHITE, J.). In accord with this purpose , Congress ex-
pressly provided for perhaps the most effective of all reme-
dies in a federal funding statute: the cutting off of funds . ~ In 
VI. Thus, the apparent result is that a suit against goL·em 111ental recipi-
ents of federal funds-who may be sued under * 1983-will be governed by 
a different standard of liability than a suit against pri ua te recipients of fed-
eral funds. One would have difficulty explaining this result in term of the 
legislative history of Title VI. 
' J USTICE MARSHALL argues that private relief must be available be-
cause the statutory remedy of a fund cut-off is "impractical" and "too Dra-
81-431-CONCUR 
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addition, it created a carefully constructed administrative 
procedure to insure that such withholding of funds was re-
quired only where appropriate. In light of these factors, I 
do not believe that Congress intended to authorize private 
suits but failed to do so through some inadvertance. See 
also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265, 381 (1978) (WHITE, J.) ("[T]here is no express pro-
vision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be 
quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to 
the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, in-
tended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce 
Title VI"). a I would affirm the judgment below solely on 
this issue. 
II 
There is, however, an alternative ground for affirmance. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
conian to be widely used." Post, at +-5 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 
5, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In my view, such reasoning evinces a 
departure from the principle that legislative intent is the guide to implying 
a right of action. The judiciary is not free to decide that remedies affirma-
tively and expressly adopted by Congress are so "impractical" or "Draco-
nian" that judicially-created remedies are necessary. Rather, the fact 
that Congress expressly adopted one remedy-and one only-should be 
viewed as a congressional choice that should be obeyed. See Cannon v. 
Unive1·sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
("Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mecha-
nism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially re-
luctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforce-
ment purposes."). 
' I also would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI 
may not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Congress' creation of an 
express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly sug-
gests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either 
under the statute itself or under§ 1983. See Middlese.r County Sewerage 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1981); cf. 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
(an exception to § 1983 liability is "where the governing statute provides an 
exclusive remedy for viplations of its terms."). 
81-431-CONCUR 
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respondents had failed to show any intentional discrimina-
tion. The Court of Appeals, relying on the opinions in 
Bakke, held that such a showing-one that must be made to 
establish an equal protection claim-is a prerequisite to a 
successful Title VI claim. I agree with JusTICE STEVENS, 
post, at 5-9, that the Court of Appeals was correct in its 
reading of our opinions in Bakke. 
My conclusion in Bakke was that "[i]n view of the clear leg-
islative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 438 U. S., at 287. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN undertook a thorough analysis of the 
legislative history in reaching the same conclusion. See id., 
at 328-340. They concluded "that Title VI's definition of ra-
cial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Con-
stitution's." I d., at 352. This construction necessarily re-
quires rejection of the prior analysis in Lau v. Nichols, 414 
U. S. 563 (1974), that discriminatory impact suffices to estab-
lish liability under Title VI.~ In my view, the Court of Ap-
peals therefore was fully justified in holding that petitioners 
failed to establish their Title VI claims. ·' 
'The Lau Court did not undertake any analysis of the legislative history 
of Title VI, reaching its conclusion essentially without supporting reason-
ing. I have no occasion here to consider whether the result in Lew may 
stand despite rejection of its assumed premise. 
·, For the reasons stated by JusTICE O'CONNOR, post, at 2-4, I reject 
JUSTICE STEVENS' novel argument that an administrative agency is free to 
adopt any regulation that may be said to further the purposes of an en-
abling statute. Administrative agencies do not have-and should not 
have-such lawmaking power. 
JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE MARSHALL would avoid the explicit rea-
soning of Bakke by deferring to a prior ad mini trative construction of Title 
VI. See ante, at 9-10 (opinion of WHITE, J .); post. at 14-20 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). I do not question the view that the Court should "sustai[n] 
a reasonable administrative interpretation even if we would have reached a 
' I 
81-431-CONCUR 
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For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
different result had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding." 
Post, at 18 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). But I know of no precedent what-
ever for asserting that this deference to administrative interpretation is 
proper after this Court already has issued a definitive-and contrary-con-
struction of its own. Moreover, in Bakke JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE 
MARSHALL agreed that "[n]owhere is there any suggestion that Title VI 
was intended to terminate federal funding for any reason other than con-
sideration of race or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner 
inconsistent with the standards incorporated in the Constitution." 438 
U. S., at 332 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, 
JJ .). If "nowhere" is there any evidence that Congress intended the Title 
VI standard to differ from the constitutional standard, clearly an agency 
interpretation to the contrary is entitled to no deference. 
~· .. 
1st DRAFT 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-431 
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I write separately. The many opinions 
filed in this case draw lines that are not required by, and in-
deed in some instances seem incompatible with, our prior de-
cisions. Our opinions today will further confuse rather than 
guide. 1 
' In particular, the Court is divided as to the standard of proof required 
to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI. A majority of the 
Court agrees that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of discrimi-
natory intent. See infra, at 3-4; post, at 1-2 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in 
the judgment); post, at 9 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN 
and BLACKMUN, JJ.) ("Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary 
component of a valid Title VI claim"). Only JUSTICES WHITE and MAR-
SHALL believe that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of 
discriminatory effect, and JuSTICE WHITE would recognize only non-
compensatory, prospective relief for such a violation. See ante, at 21. 
JUSTICES BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, however, believe that a 
violation of the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI may be estab-
lished by proof of discriminatory impact. See post, at 12. 
Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory ef-
fect suffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce 
the regulations rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that the 
regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983; 
anyone invoking the implied right of action under Title VI would be limited 
by the discriminatory-intent standard required to prove violations of Title 
81-431-CONCUR 
2 GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N. Y. C. 
I 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730 
(1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting), I would have held that Con-
gress intended no implied private right of action under Title 
IX of the Civil Rights Act. For the same general reasons, I 
also would hold that petitioners may not maintain this action 
under Title VI. 
Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to 
remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The 
result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available 
remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without 
clear legislative guidance. We have recognized repeatedly 
that whether a private right of action may be implied re-
quires a determination of congressional intent. See, e. g., 
Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look, of course, to the legislative history and 
in particular to what other remedies have been provided. 
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11, 19 (1979) ("it is an elemental canon of statutory con-
struction that where a statute expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others 
into it"). 
The legislative history of Title VI is replete with refer-
ences to the Act's central purpose of ensuring that taxpayers' 
money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, at 17 (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). In accord with this purpose, Congress ex-
pressly provided for perhaps the most effective of all reme-
dies in a federal funding statute: the cutting off of funds. 2 In 
VI. Thus, the apparent result is that a suit against governmental recipi-
ents of federal funds-who may be sued under § 1983-will be governed by 
a different standard of liability than a suit against private recipients of fed-
eral funds. One would have difficulty explaining this result in terms of the 
legislative history of Title VI. 
' JUSTICE MARSHALL argues that private relief must be available be-
cause the statutory remedy of a fund cut-off is "impractical" and "too Dra-
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addition, it created a carefully constructed administrative 
procedure to insure that such withholding of funds was re-
quired only where appropriate. In light of these factors, I 
do not believe that Congress intended to authorize private 
suits but failed to do so through some inadvertance. See 
also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265, 381 (1978) (opinion of WHITE, J.) ("[T]here is no 
express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and 
it would be quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully at-
tending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the 
Act, intended silently to create a private cause of action to 
enforce Title VI"). 3 I would affirm the judgment below 
solely on this issue. 
II 
There is, however, an alternative ground for affirmance. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
conian to be widely used." Post, at 4-5 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 
5, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In my view, such reasoning evinces a 
departure from the principle that legislative intent is the guide to implying 
a right of action. The judiciary is not free to decide that remedies affirma-
tively and expressly adopted by Congress are so "impractical" or "Draco-
nian" that judicially-created remedies are necessary. Rather, the fact 
that Congress expressly adopted one remedy-and one only-should be 
viewed as a congressional choice that should be obeyed. See Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
("Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mecha-
nism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially re-
luctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforce-
ment purposes."). 
3 I also would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI 
may not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Congress' creation of an 
express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly sug-
gests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either 
under the statute itself or under § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1981); cf. 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
(an exception to § 1983 liability is "where the governing statute provides an 
exclusive remedy for violations of its terms"). 
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respondents had failed to show any intentional discrimina-
tion. The Court of Appeals, relying on the opinions in 
Bakke, held that such a showing-one that must be made to 
establish an equal protection claim-is a prerequisite to a 
successful Title VI claim. I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS, 
post, at 5-9, that the Court of Appeals was correct in its 
reading of our opinions in Bakke. 
My conclusion in Bakke was that "[i]n view of the clear leg-
islative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 438 U. S., at 287. Jus-
TICES BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN un-
dertook a thorough analysis of the legislative history in 
reaching the same conclusion. See id., at 328--340. They 
concluded "that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is 
absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's." I d., at 352. 
This construction necessarily requires rejection of the prior 
decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), that dis-
criminatory impact suffices to establish liability under Title 
VI. 4 In my view, the Court of Appeals therefore was fully 
justified in holding that petitioners failed to establish their 
Title VI claims. 5 
For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
4 The Lau Court did not undertake any analysis of the legislative history 
of Title VI, reaching its conclusion essentially without supporting reason-
ing. I have no occasion here to consider whether the result in Lau may 
stand despite rejection of its assumed premise. 
5 For the reasons stated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, post, at 2-4, I reject 
JuSTICE STEVENS' novel argument that an administrative agency is free to 
adopt any regulation that may be said to further the purposes of an en-
abling statute. Administrative agencies do not have-and should not 
have-such lawmaking power. 
JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL would avoid the explicit reasoning of 
Bakke by deferring to a prior administrative construction of Title VI. See 
ante, at 9-10 (opinion of WHITE, J.); post, at 14-20 (MARSHALL, J., dissent-
ing). I do not question the view that the Court should "sustai[n] a reason-
able administrative interpretation even if we would have reached a differ-
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ent result had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding." Post, 
at 18 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). But I know of no precedent whatever 
for asserting that this deference to administrative interpretation is proper 
after this Court already has issued a definitive-and contrary-construc-
tion of its own. Moreover, in Bakke JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL 
agreed that "[n]owhere is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended 
to terminate federal funding for any reason other than consideration of race 
or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with 
the standards incorporated in the Constitution." 438 U. S., at 332 (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). If"nowhere" 
is there any evidence that Congress intended the Title VI standard to dif-
fer from the constitutional standard, clearly an agency interpretation to 
the contrary is entitled to no deference. 
C HAMBERS OF 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-·i:U 
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION, ETC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, I 
~ 
concurring in the judgment. : 
With reluctance, I write separately. The many opinions 
filed in this case draw lines that are not required by, and in-
deed in some instances seem incompatible with, our prior de-
cisions. Our opinions today will further confuse rather than 
guide. 1 
1 In particular, the Court is divided as to the standard of proof required 
to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI. Seven members ( 
of the Court agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of 
discriminatory intent. See infra, at 3-4; post, at 1 (REHNQUIST, J., con- I 
curring in the judgment); post, at 1-2 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the j 
judgment); post, at 9 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN and 
BLACKMUN, JJ.) ("Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary compo-
nent of a valid Title VI claim"). Only JUSTICES WHITE and MARsHALL 
believe that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discrimi-
natory effect, and JUSTICE WHITE would recognize only noncompensatory, 
prospective relief for such a violation. See ante, at 21. JUSTICES BREN-
NAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, however, believe that a violation of the 
regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof of 
discriminatory impact. See post, at 12 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). ( 
Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory ef-
fect suffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce 
the regulations rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that the 
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I 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730 
(1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting), I would have held that Con-
gress intended no implied private right of action under Title 
IX of the Civil Rights Act. For the same general reasons, I 
also would hold that petitioners may not maintain this action 
under Title VI. 
Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to 
remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The 
result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available 
remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without 
clear legislative guidance. We have recognized repeatedly 
that whether a private right of action may be implied re-
quires a determination of congressional intent. See, e. g., 
Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look, of course, to the legislative history, 
and in particular to what other remedies have been provided. 
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11, 19 (1979) ("it is an elemental canon of statutory con-
struction that where a statute expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others 
into it"). 
The legislative history of Title VI is replete with refer-
ences to the Act's central purpose of ensuring that taxpayers' 
money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, at 17 (opin-
ion ofWHITE, J.). In accord with this purpose, Congress ex-
regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983; 
anyone invoking the implied right of action under Title VI would be limited 
by the discriminatory-intent standard required to prove violations of Title 
VI. Thus, the apparent result is that a suit against governmental recipi-
ents of federal funds-who may be sued under § 19~will be governed by 
a different standard of liability than a suit against private recipients of fed-
eral funds. One would have difficulty explaining this result in tenns of the 
legislative history of Title VI. 
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pressly provided for perhaps the most effective of all reme-
dies in a federal funding statute: the cutting off of funds. 2 In 
addition, it created a carefully constructed administrative 
procedure to ensure that such withholding of funds is ordered f 
only where appropriate. In light of these factors, I do not 
believe that Congress intended to authorize private suits but 
failed to do so through some inadvertence. See also Regents 
ofthe University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 381 
(1978) (opinion of WHITE, J.) ("[T]here is no express provi-
sion for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be 
quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to 
the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, in-
tended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce 
Title VI"). 3 I would affirm the judgment below solely on 
this issue. 
2 JUSTICE MARSHALL argues that private relief must be available be-
cause the statutory remedy of a fund cut-off is ''impractical" and "too Dra-
conian to be widely used." Post, at 4-5 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 
5, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In my view, such reasoning evinces a 
departure from the principle that legislative intent is the guide to implying 
a right of action. The judiciary is not free to decide that remedies affirma-
tively and expressly adopted by Congress are so ''impractical" or "Draco-
nian" that judicially-created remedies are necessary. See Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate question is one 
of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can im-
prove upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law''). 
Rather, the fact that Congress expressly adopted one remedy-and one 
only-should be viewed as a congressional choice that should be obeyed. 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 749 (1979) (POWELL, 
J., dissenting) (''Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alter-
native mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be 
especially reluctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services 
for enforcement purposes."). 
3 I also would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI 
may not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Congress' creation of an 
express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly sug-
gests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either 
under the statute itself or under§ 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage 
'. 
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II 
There is, however, an alternative ground-for affirmance. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
respondents had failed to show any intentional discrimina-
tion. The Court of Appeals, relying on the opinions in 
Bakke, held that such a showing-one that must be made to 
establish an equal protection claim-is a prerequisite to a 
successful Title VI claim. I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS, 
post, at ~9, that the Court of Appeals was correct in its 
reading of our opinions in Bakke. 
My conclusion in Bakke was that "[i]n view of the clear leg-
islative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 438 U. S., at 287. Jus-
TICES BRENNAN, WmTE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN un-
dertook a thorough analysis of the legislative history in 
reaching the same conclusion. See id., at 328-340. They 
concluded "that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is 
absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's." I d., at 352. 
This construction necessarily requires rejection of the prior 
decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), that dis-
criminatory impact suffices to establish liability under Title 
Vl. 4 In my view, the Court of Appeals therefore was fully 
justified in holding that petitioners failed to establish their 
Title VI claims. 5 
For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1981); cf. 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
(an exception to § 1983 liability is ''where the governing statute provides an 
exclusive remedy for violations of its terms"). 
• The Lau Court did not undertake any analysis of the legislative history 
of Title VI, reaching its conclusion essentially without supporting reason-
ing. I have no occasion here to consider whether the result in Lau may 
stand despite rejection of its assumed premise. 
5 For the reasons stated by JusTICE O'CONNOR, post, at 2-4, I reject 
JUSTICE STEVENS' novel argument that an administrative agency is free to 
adopt any regulation that may be said to further the purposes of an en-
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abling statute. Administrative agencies do not have-and should not 
have-such lawmaking power. 
JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL would avoid the explicit reasoning of 
Bakke by deferring to a prior administrative construction of Title VI. See 
ante, at 9-10 (opinion of WHITE, J.); post, at 14-20 (MARsHALL, J., dissent-
ing). I do not question the view that the Court should "sustai[n] a reason-
able administrative interpretation even if we would have reached a differ-
ent result had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding." Post, 
at 18 (MARsHALL, J., dissenting). But I lmow of no precedent whatever 
for asserting that this deference to administrative interpretation is proper 
after this Court already has issued a definitive-and contrary-eonstruc-
tion of its own. Moreover, in Bakke JUSTICES WHITE and MARsHALL 
agreed that "[n]owhere is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended 
to terminate federal funding for any reason other than consideration of race 
or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with 
the standards incorporated in the Constitution." 438 U. S., at 332 (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARsHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). lf"nowhere" 
is there any evidence that Congress intended the Title VI standard to dif-
fer from the constitutional standard, clearly an agency interpretation to 
the contrary is entitled to no deference. 
·" 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, 
concurring in the judgment. 
With reluctance, I write separately. The many opinions 
filed in this case draw lines that are not required by, and in-
deed in some instances seem incompatible with, our prior de-
cisions. Our opinions today will further confuse rather than 
guide. 1 
1 In particular, the Court is divided as to the standard of proof required 
to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI. Seven members 
of the Court agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of 
discriminatory intent. See infra, at 4-5; post, at 1 (REHNQUIST, J., con- J 
curring in the judgment); post, at 1-2 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the 
judgment); post, at 8 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN and I 
BLACKMUN, JJ.) ("Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary compo-
nent of a valid Title VI claim"). Only JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL 
believe that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discrimi-
natory effect, and JusTICE WHITE would recognize only noncompensatory, 
prospective relief for such a violation. See ante, at 20-21. JuSTICES 
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, however, believe that a violation of 
the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof 
of discriminatory impact. See post, at 12 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory ef-
fect suffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce 
the regulations rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that the 
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I 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730 
(1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting), I would have held that Con-
gress intended no implied private right of action under Title 
IX of the Civil Rights Act. For the same general reasons, I 
also would hold that petitioners may not maintain this action 
under Title VI. 
Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to 
remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The 
result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available 
remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without 
clear legislative guidance. We have recognized repeatedly 
that whether a private right of action may be implied re-
quires a determination of congressional intent. See, e. g., 
Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look, of course, to the legislative history, 
and in particular to what other remedies have been provided. 
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Le'Wis, 444 
U. S. 11, 19 (1979) ("it is an elemental canon of statutory con-
struction that where a statute expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others 
into it"). 
The legislative history of Title VI is replete with refer-
ences to the Act's central purpose of ensuring that taxpayers' 
money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, at 17 (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). In accord with this purpose, Congress ex-
regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983; 
anyone invoking the implied right of action under Title VI would be limited 
by the discriminatory-intent standard required to prove violations of Title 
VI. Thus, the apparent result is that a suit against governmental recipi-
ents of federal funds-who may be sued under § 1983-will be governed by 
a different standard of liability than a suit against private recipients of fed-
eral funds. One would have difficulty explaining this result in terms of the 
legislative history of Title VI. 
·" 
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pressly provided for perhaps the most effective of all reme-
dies in a federal funding statute: the cutting off of funds. 2 In 
addition, it created a carefully constructed administrative 
procedure to ensure that such withholding of funds is ordered 
only where appropriate. In light of these factors, I do not 
believe that Congress intended to authorize private suits but 
failed to do so through some inadvertence. See also Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 381 
(1978) (opinion of WHITE, J.) ("[T]here is no express provi-
sion for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be 
quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to 
the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, in-
tended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce 
Title VI"). 3 I would affirm the judgment below solely on 
this issue. 
2 JUSTICE MARSHALL argues that private relief must be available be-
cause the statutory remedy of a fund cut-off is "impractical" and "too Dra-
conian to be widely used." Post, at 12-13 (dissenting opinion). See post, 
at 5, n. 7 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting). In my view, such reasoning evinces a 
departure from the principle that legislative intent is the guide to implying 
a right of action. The judiciary is not free to decide that remedies affirma-
tively and expressly adopted by Congress are so "impractical" or "Draco-
nian" that judicially-created remedies are necessary. See Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate question is one 
of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can im-
prove upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law"). 
Rather, Congress' express adoption of one remedy-and one only-should 
be viewed as a congressional choice that should be obeyed. See Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
("Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mecha-
nism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially re-
luctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforce-
ment purposes."). 
3 I also would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI 
may not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Congress' creation of an 
express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly sug-
gests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either 
under the statute itself or under§ 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage 
.. 
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II 
There is, however, an alternative ground for affirmance. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
petitioners had failed to show any intentional discrimination. I 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the opinions in Bakke, held 
that such a showing-one that must be made to establish an 
equal protection claim-is a prerequisite to a successful Title 
VI claim. I agree with JusTICE STEVENS, post, at &-8, that 1 
the Court of Appeals was correct in its reading of our opin-
ions in Bakke. 
My conclusion in Bakke was that "[i]n view of the clear leg-
islative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 438 U. S., at 287. Jus-
TICES BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN un-
dertook a thorough analysis of the legislative history in 
reaching the same conclusion. See id., at 328-340. They 
concluded "that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is 
absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's." I d., at 352. 
This construction necessarily requires rejection of the prior 
decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), that dis-
criminatory impact suffices to establish liability under Title 
VI. 4 In my view, the Court of Appeals therefore was fully 
justified in holding that petitioners failed to establish their 
Title VI claims. 5 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1981); cf. 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
(an exception to § 1983 liability is "where the governing statute provides an 
exclusive remedy for violations of its terms"). 
'The Lau Court did not undertake any analysis of the legislative history 
of Title VI, reaching its conclusion essentially without supporting reason-
ing. I have no occasion here to consider whether the result in Lau may 
stand despite rejection of its assumed premise. 
5 For the reasons stated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, post, at 2-4, I reject 
JUSTICE STEVENS' novel argument that an administrative agency is free to 
adopt any regulation that may be said to further the purposes of an en-
. ~ 
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For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. 
abling statute. Administrative agencies do not have-and should not 
have-such lawmaking power. 
JusTICES WHITE and MARSHALL would avoid the explicit reasoning of 
Bakke by deferring to a prior administrative construction of Title VI. See 
ante, at 9-10 (opinion of WHITE, J.); post, at 3-9 (MARSHALL, J., dissent- f 
ing). I do not question the view that the Court should "sustai[n] a reason-
able administrative interpretation even if we would have reached a differ-
ent result had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding." Post, 
at 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). But I know of no precedent whatever for 
asserting that this deference to administrative interpretation is proper 
after this Court already has issued a definitive-and contrary-construc-
tion of its own. Moreover, in Bakke JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL 
agreed that "[n]owhere is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended 
to terminate federal funding for any reason other than consideration of race 
or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with 
the standards incorporated in the Constitution." 438 U. S., at 332 (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). If"nowhere" 
is there any evidence that Congress intended the Title VI standard to dif-
fer from the constitutional standard, clearly an agency interpretation to 
the contrary is entitled to no deference . 
, To: The _Chief Justice 
;0 I _ _ _ . I. . J ust1ce Brennan 
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The threshold issue before the Court is whether the pri-
vate plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent 
to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S. C. §2000d, et seq,' and administrative imple-
menting regulations promulgated thereunder. I conclude, 
as~es, in separate opinions, that the Court 
of Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent. 2 - ~ --
'Section 601 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, provides: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." 
2 The five of us reach the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred by 
different routes. JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, reasons that, althou h Ti leVI itself re uires roof 
of discriminatory intent, the administrative regulations mcorporating a dis-
par~d are valid. Post, at -. JUSTICE MARSHALL 
would hold that, under Title VI itself, proof of disparate impact discrimina-
tion is all that is necessary. Post, at -. I agree with JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL that discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a violation 
of Title VI. I also believe that the regulations are valid, even assuming 
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However, I conclude that the judgment below should be af-
firmed on other grounds, because, in the absence of proof of 
discriminatory animus, com ensatory relief should not be 
awarded to private Title VI p ain 1 s; un ess discriminatory 
intent is shown, declaratory and limited injunctive relief 
should be the only available private remedies for Title VI vi-
olations. There being four other Justices who would affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that judgment is ac-
cordingly affirmed. 
I 
This class action involves a challenge by black and Hispanic 
police officers, petitioners here,3 to several written examina-
tions administered by New York City between 1968 and 1970 
that were used to make entry-level appointments to the city's 
police department (the "Department") through October 
1974.4 The District Court found that the challenged exami-
nations had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass-
rates of blacks and Hispanics and were not job-related. 
These findings were not disturbed in the Court of Appeals. 
Each member of the plaintiff class seeking relief from dis-
crimination achieved a passing score on one of the challenged 
examinations and was hired as a police officer. Since ap-
pointments were made in order of test score, however, the 
examinations caused the class members to be hired later than 
similarly-situated whites, which lessened the petitioners' se-
niority and related benefits. Accordingly, when the Depart-
ment laid off police officers in June 1975 on a "last-hired, 
first-fired" basis, those officers who had achieved the lowest 
discrimination. Part II, infra. 
3 The class representatives are The Guardians Association of the New 
York City Police Department, Inc., The Hispanic Society of the New York 
City Police Department, Inc., and Oswaldo Perez and Felix E. Santos. 
'Petitioners also alleged that the Department's 5'7" minimum height re-
quirement discriminated against Hispanics. The disposition of this issue 
in the lower courts is not now before us. 
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scores on the examinations were laid off first, and the plain-
tiff black and Hispanic officers were disproportionately af-
fected by the layoffs. 
On April 30, 1976, petitioners filed the present suiV 
against the Department and other New York City officials 
and entities, the respondents here. Petitioners' amended 
complaint alleged that the June 1975 layoffs violated their 
rights under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U. S. C. §§2000d, et seq., and 2000e, et seq., under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983, and under various other state and federal 
laws. 6 The primary allegation of the complaint was that but 
for the discriminatory impact of the challenged examinations 
upon minorities, petitioners would have been hired earlier 
and therefore would have accumulated sufficient seniority to 
withstand the layoffs. 
After a hearing, the District Court held that, although pe-
titioners had failed to prove that the respondents had acted 
with discriminatory intent, the use of the exams violated 
5 This was petitioners' second judicial attack on the Department's use of 
the examinations. Petitioners first filed suit in 1972, but the District 
Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the mak-
ing of appointments from the ranked eligibility lists generated by the chal-
lenged examinations, on the basis that the eligibility lists would soon be 
fully exhausted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 400 (CA2 1973). Petitioners unsuccess-
fully sought to revive the earlier case before filing the present suit. See 
633 F . 2d 232, 235 (CA2 1980). 
6 Among these was a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which the District 
Court twice rejected because petitioners failed to prove discriminatory in-
tent, which the court found to be a necessary element of a § 1981 cause of 
action. 431 F . Supp. 526, 534 (S. D.N. Y. 1977); 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 
n. 4 (S. D.N. Y. 1979). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 633 F. 2d 232, 
263-268 (CA2 1980). Petitioners raised this § 1981 issue in their petition 
for certiorari, but they abandoned it after our decision last Term in General 
Building Contractors Ass'n, Inc . v. Pennsylvania, -- U. S. -- (1982) 
decided the issue adversely to them. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 1, 
n.*. 
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Title VII, because the tests had a disparate impact upon mi-
norities and were not proven by respondents to be job-re-
lated. 7 The court therefore granted petitioners' motion for a 
preliminary injunction restraining the Department from fir-
ing or recalling any police officers until seniority lists were 
reordered to accord petitioners the seniority they would have 
had but for respondents' discriminatory practices. 431 F. 
Supp. 526 (S. D.N. Y. 1977). In light of its holding under 
Title VII, the District Court deemed it unnecessary to decide 
the merits of petitioners' claims under Title VI. Id., at 530, 
n. 2. 
On respondents' appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the 
District Court's decision and remanded the case for reconsid-
eration in light of our holding in Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324 (1977), in which we ruled that a bona fide se-
niority system that merely perpetuates the effects of pre-
Title VII discrimination is protected by § 703(h) of that stat-
ute, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 562 F. 2d 38 (CA2 1977). On 
remand, the District Court found that Teamsters had ren-
dered its previous holding untenable to the extent that it 
granted relief with respect to discrimination occurring prior 
to March 24, 1972, the date on which Title VII became appli-
cable to municipalities. See Pub.L. 92-261 § 2(1), 86 Stat. 
103 (1972). This meant that, under Title VII, class members 
hired prior to the effective date were not entitled to any re-
lief, and that the remaining members of the class were only 
entitled to back seniority awards that did not take into ac-
count time periods prior to that date. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 
1280 (S. D.N. Y. 1979). 
The court then turned to Title VI, which has been appli-
cable to municipalities since its enactment in 1964, to see if 
that provision would provide relief for the time periods prior 
7 The District Court correctly relied on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U. S. 424 (1971), and its progeny, as the framework for its Title VII dis-
parate impact analysis. 431 F. Supp., at 53~39. 
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to March 24, 1972. After considering Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 
66 (1975), and the various opinions in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), the District 
Court concluded that an implied private right of action ex-
isted under Title VI. 466 F. Supp., at 1281-85. Then, cit-
ing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), and Title VI admin-
istrative interpretative regulations adopted by several 
federal agencies, the court reasoned that proof of discrimina-
tory effect is enough to establish a violation of Title VI in a 
private action, thereby rejecting respondents' contention 
that only proof of discriminatory intent could suffice. I d. , at 
1285-87. Finally, turning to the question of relief, the court 
held that the same remedies available under Title VII should 
be available under Title VI, unless they would conflict with 
some purpose peculiar to Title VI. "In the instant case, 
back seniority, approved as a Title VII remedy in Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 
47 L.Ed. 2d 444 (1976), is just as necessary to make 
discriminatees 'whole' under Title VI." 466 F. Supp., at 
1287. 
Accordingly, relief was granted to the entire class pursu-
ant to Title VI. In a subsequent order, the court set forth a 
detailed plan for the determination of the constructive senior-
ity to which each individual member of the class would be en-
titled, and the corresponding monetary and nonmonetary en-
titlements that would be derived therefrom. The court also 
ordered respondents to meet and consult with petitioners on 
the preparation and use of future examinations. App. at 
A99-A107. 
Respondents appealed once again to the Second Circuit, 
which affirmed the relief under Title VII but reversed as to 
Title VI. 633 F. 2d 232 (CA2 1980). All three members of 
the panel agreed that the award of Title VI relief could not be 
sustained, but the panel divided on the rationale for this con-
clusion. The majority held that the trial court erred by con-
cluding that Title VI does not require proof of discriminatory 
·,• 
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intent. They believed that this Court's decision in Lau v. 
Nichols, supra, which held that proof of discriminatory im-
pact could suffice to establish a Title VI violation, had been 
implicitly overruled by the judgment and supporting opinions 
in Bakke, supra. 633 F. 2d at, 270 (Kelleher, J.); id., at 
274-75(Coffrin, J.). 
The third member of the panel, Judge Meskill, declined to 
reach the question whether Title VI requires proof of dis-
criminatory intent. Instead, he concluded that the "compen-
satory remedies sought by and awarded to plaintiffs in the 
case at bar are not available to private litigants under Title 
VI." Id., at 255. Nothing in the legislative history, Judge 
Meskill observed, indicated that Title VI was intended to 
compensate individuals excluded from the benefits of a pro-
gram receiving federal assistance, and in his view a compen-
satory private remedy would work at cross-purposes with the 
administrative enforcement mechanism expressly provided 
by § 602 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000d-1, and with the ob-
jectives of the federal assistance statutes. 633 F. 2d, at 
255-62.8 
After the Second Circuit denied petitions for rehearing 
from both sides, - F. 2d - (CA2 1981), we granted the 
plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, -- U. S. --,9 which 
8 The panel majority disagreed with Judge Meskill's views, reading our 
decisions in Bakke and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 
(1979), as allowing a private right of action under Title VI irrespective of 
the compensatory effect of the relief sought or granted. Also, fearing that 
part of the noncompensatory relief in the District Court's order might not 
be available to the entire class under Title VII, the court could not agree 
with Judge Meskill's conclusion that his rationale made it unnecessary to 
decide whether Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. 633 F. 
2d, at 274. 
9 Respondents also filed a petition for certiorari, in which they seek re-
view of the Court of Appeals' determination that the plaintiff class is enti-
tled to relief under Title VII. Civil Service Comm'n v. The Guardians 
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claimed error solely on the basis that proof of discriminatory 
intent is not required to establish a Title VI violation. 
II 
The Court squarel.l_held in Lau v. Nichols, supra, that 
Title VI forbidsthe use of federal funds not only in programs 
that intentionally discriminate on racial grounds but also in 
those endeavors that have a dis arate im act on racial minor-
ities. The Court of Appeals recognized this but was of the 
view, as are respondents, that Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, supra, had confin.ed the .reach of Title 
VI to those programs that are oper.ated in an intentionally 
discriminatory maruier. For two reasons, I disagree with 
this reading of Bakke. "-- -
A 
First, I recognize that in Bakke five Justices, including 
myself, declared that Title VI ~tom reaches no 
further than the Constitution, which suggests that in light of 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), Title VI does not 
of its own force proscribe unintentional racial discrimina-
tion. 10 The Court of Appeals thought these declarations 
were inconsistent with Lau's holding that Title VI contains 
its own prohibition of disparate-impact racial discrimina-
tion. The issue in Bakke, howey_er, was whether Title VI 
forbids intenTional discrimination in the form of affirmative 
ac lOll ~emedy past discrimination, aiscriminafion 
thatfs permitted by the Constitution. Holding that Title VI 
does not bar such affirmative action if the Constitution does 
not is plainly not determinative of whether Title VI pro-
scribes unintentional discrimination in addition to the inten-
tional discrimination that the Constitution forbids. 
10 See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
287 (POWELL, J.); id. , at 328 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE , MARSHALL, 
and BLACKMUN, JJ.). 
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It is sensible to construe Title VI, a statute intended to 
protect racial minorities, as not forbidding those intentional, ? 
but benign, racial classifications that are permitted by the 
Constitution, yet as proscribing burdensome, non-benign 
discriminations of a kind not contrary to the Constitution. 
Although some of the language in the Bakke opinions has a 
broader sweep, the holdings in B.Jl!!ke and Lau are e!!tirely 
consistent. Absent some more telling indication rn-The 
Bakke opinions that Lau was being overruled, I would not so 
hold. 
B 
Even if I am wrong in concluding that Bakke did not over-
rule Lau, as so many of my colleagues believe, there is an-
other reason for holding that disproportionate-impact dis-
crimination is subject to the Title VI regime. In Lau, the 
Court was unanimous in affirming a holding that the school 
district there involved was forbidden by Title VI from prac-
ticing unintentional as well as intentional discrimination 
against racial minorities. Five Justices were of the view 
that Title VI itself forbade impact discrimination. Lau, 
supra, at 56&-569. · Justice Ste\vart, joined by THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurred in the result. 
The concurring opinion stated that it was not at all clear that 
Title VI, standing alone, would prohibit unintentional dis-
crimination, but that the Title VI implementing regulations, 
which explicitly forbade impact discrimination, were valid be-
cause not inconsistent with the purposes of Title VI. I d., at 
56~571. 11 Even if Bakke must be taken as overruling Lau's 
11 Section 602 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1, empowers agencies pro-
viding federal financial assistance to issue "rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the ob-
jectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance .... " Justice 
Stewart explained that the regulations therefore should be upheld as valid, 
because they were " 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling leg-
islation.' " Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, 571 (1974) (opinion concurring in 
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holding that the statute itself does not reach disparate im-
pact, none of the five Justices whose opinions arguably com-
pel this result considered whether the statute would permit 
regulations that clearly reached such discrimination. And 
no Justice in Bakke took issue with the view of the three con-
curring Justices in Lau, who concluded that even if Title VI 
itself did not proscribe unintentional racial discrimination, it 
nevertheless permitted federal agencies to promulgate valid 
regulations with such effect. The upshot of Justice Stew-
art's opinion was that those charged with enforcing Title VI 
had sufficient discretion to enforce the statute by forbidding 
unintentional as well as intentional discrimination. Nothing 
that was said in Bakke is to the contrary. 
Of course, this leaves the question whether THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE, Justice Stewart, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN were cor-
rect in their reading of the statute. I am convinced that they 
were. The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the 
word "discrimination" is inherently so. It is surely subject 
to the construction given the anti-discrimination proscrip-
tion of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 
(1971), at least to the extent of permitting, if not requiring, 
regulations that reach disparate-impact discrimination. As 
Justice Stewart pointed out, the federal agency given en-
forcement authority had consistently construed Title VI in 
that manner. Lau, supra, at 570 (opinion concurring in the 
result). Moreover, soon after the passage of Title VI, the 
Department of Justice, which had helped draft the legisla-
tion, assisted seven agencies, in the preparation of regula-
tions incorporating the disparate impact standard of dis-
crimination. 12 These regulations were early interpretations 
the result) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 
U. S. 356, 369 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 
393 u. s. 268, 280-281 (1969)). 
12 See 29 Fed. Reg. 16274-16305 (1964). As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, 
post, at 16, before long after these initial regulations were promulgated, 
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of the statute by the agencies charged with its enforcement, 
and we should not reject them absent clear inconsistency 
with the face or structure of the statute or with the unmistak-
able mandate of the legislative history. Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). I discern noth-
ing in the legislative history of Title VI, and nothing has been 
presented by respondents, that is at odds with the adminis-
trative construction of the statutory terms. The Title, fur-
thermore, has been consistently administered in this manner 
for almost two decades without interference by Congress. 13 
Under these circumstances, it must be concluded that Title 
VI reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination as 
well as deliberate racial discrimination. 14 
III 
Although the Court of Appeals erred in construing Title 
VI, it does not necessarily follow that its judgment should be 
every Cabinet department and about 40 federal agencies adopted Title VI 
regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination. 
13 JUSTICE MARSHALL details, post, at 17-18, how Congress has rebuffed 
efforts to overturn the Title VI disparate-impact regulations, and how 
Congress, with full awareness of how the agencies were interpreting Title 
VI, has modeled later statutes on § 601 of Title VI, thus indicating ap-
proval of the administrative definition. Cf. Bob Jones University v. 
United States, -U.S. -(1983);Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,291-300 
(1981) (agency interpretation of a statute may be confirmed or ratified by 
congressional inaction). ' 
"JUSTICE STEVENS correctly states that "when the Court unequivocally 
rejects one reading of a statute, its action should be respected in future 
litigation. . . . If a statute is to be amended after it has been 
authoratatively construed by this Court, that task should almost always be 
performed by Congress." Post, at 8. However, JUSTICE STEVENS ap-
pears to ignore his own admonition by disregarding the square holding of 
Lau v. Nichols, the only case that directly addressed the present issue. 
In Lau, we "unequivocally reject[ed]" the notion that Title VI requires 
proof of discriminatory intent. Since Congress has chosen not to modify 
Title VI after it was "authoritatively construed" in Lau, we should be espe-
cially slow to adopt a new construction of the statute at this late date. 
81-431-0PINION 
GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N. Y. C. 11 
reversed. As an alternative ground for affirmance, respond-
ents defend the judgment on the basis that there is no private 
right of action available under Title VI that will afford peti-
tiOnerStlierelief that they seek. 16 I agree that the relief de-
ni~d pet~ioners under Title VII is ~available to them pnder 
Title Vi, at least, where no intentional discrimination has 
been provecf,aSis the case fiere. 
A 
I deal first with the matter of a private cause of action 
under Title VI. In Lau v. Nichols, supra, non-English 
speaking Chinese students sought relief against the San 
Francisco school district, claiming that they should be taught 
the English language, that instruction should proceed in Chi-
nese, or that some other way should be provided to afford 
them equal educational opportunity. This Court, reversing 
the Court of Appeals, gave relief under Title VI. The exist- , 
ence of a private cause of action under that Title, however, 
was not disputed in that case. 
Four years later, the Court decided Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, supra, which also involved a pri-
vate suit seeking relief under Title VI against state educa-
tional authorities. Four Justices assumed, but did I'!Q.t_, 
decide, that a private action was available under Title V~ 
A fifth Justice was of the \view that no private cause of action 
could be implied under the Title. 17 The four remaining Jus-
tices concluded that a private action was available. 18 
Still later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 
16 See Brief for Respondents 8-9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. 
G:'iJfrkke, supra, at 281-284 (POWELL, J.); id., at 328 (BRENNAN, MAR-
SHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). 
17 !d., at 379 (WHITE, J.). This Justice, however, was of the view that 
where the alleged discriminatory conduct constitutes state action, a cause 
of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is available. 
18 /d., at 265, 419-421, 420 n. 28 (STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., 
Stewart, and REHNQUIST, JJ.). 
\ 
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667 (1979), the Court, applying the factors specified in Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), held that private parties could sue 
to enforce the prohibitions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681, et seq., against 
gender-based discrimination in any educational program sup-
ported by federal funds. A major part of the analysis was 
that Title IX had been derived from Title VI, that Congress 
understood that private remedies were available under Title 
VI, and that Congress intended simiar remedies to be avail-
able under Title IX. 441 U. S., at 694-703. Furthermore, 
it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court's opinion 
that the congressional view was correct as to the availability 
of private actions to enforce Title VI. /d., at 710-716. Two 
Justices, in dissent, were of the view that private remedies 
under Title VI itself were not available and that the same 
was true under Title IX. Those Justices, however, asserted 
that § 1983 was available to enforce the proscriptions of Title 
VI and Title IX where the alleged discriminatory practices 
were being carried on under the color of state law. Id., at 
717-730 WHITE, J., dissenting, joined by BLACKMUN, J.) 
Thus at least eight Justices in Cannon were of the view that 
Title VI and Title IX could be enforced in a private action 
against a state or local agency receiving federal funds, such 
as the respondent Department. 19 See also Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980). 
B 
It does not ne~ow, however, that petitioners 
are ~ "make whole" remedy for repondent's al-
leged -'ritle VI violations. '-Whether-; litigant has a cause of 
action "is analytically distinct and prior to the question of 
19 One Justice disagreed with the Court's holding that a private right of 
action could be implied under Title IX itself, without expressing a view as 
to whether Title IX could be privately enforced via § 1983. Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 667, 730-749 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
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what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive." 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 239 (1979). The usual rule 
is that where legal rights have been invaded and a cause of 
action is available, a federal court may use any available rem-
edy to afford full relief. Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 
(1946). The general rule nevertheless yields where neces- ; 
sary to carry out the intent of Congress or to avoid frustrat-
ing the purposes of the sta ute mvo ved. 
For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), the Court found that a private 
right of action for only limited relief could be implied under 
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80b-1, 
et seq., which prohibits certain practices in connection with 
investment advisory contracts. Section 215 of the Act de-
clared that contracts whose formation or performance would 
violate the Act were void, and the Court concluded that Con-
gress intended "that the customary legal incidence of void-
ance would follow, including the availability of a suit for reci-
sion or for an injunction against continued operation of the 
contract." 444 U. S., at 19. But the Court refused to allow 
recovery of monetary relief in a private smt arreging viola-
tion~, in the absence of a contrary leg-
islative intent, "where a statute expressly provides a particu-
lar remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading 
others into it." Ibid. 
We have also indicated that "make whole" remedies are not 
ordinarily appropriate in private actions seeking relief for vi-
olations of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to its 
"power under the Spending Clause to place conditions on the 
grant of federal funds." Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981~cause there-
ceipt of federal funds under typical Spending Clause legisla-
tion is a consensual matter: the State or other grantee weighs 
the benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and 
agreeing to comply with the conditions attached to their re-
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ceipt. Typically, before funds are advanced, the appropriate 
federal official will determine whether the grantee's plan, 
proposal or program will satisfy the conditions of the grant or 
other extension of federal funds, and the grantee will have in 
mind what its obligations will be. When in a later private 
suit brought by those for whose benefit the federal money 
was intended to be used it is determined, contrary to the 
State's position, that the conditions attached to the funds are 
not being complied with, it may be that the recipient would 
rather terminate its receipt of federal money rather than as-
sume the unanticipated burdens. 
Thus, the Court has more than once announced that in } 
fashioning remedies for violations of Spending Clause stat-
utes by recipients of federal funds, the courts must recog-
nize that the recipient has "alternative choices of assuming 
the additional costs" of complying with what a court has an-
nounced is necessary to conform to federal law or "of not us-
ing federal funds" and withdrawing from the federal program 
entirely. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420-421 (1970). 
Although a court may identify the violation and enjoin its 
continuance or order recipients of federal funds prospectively 
to perform their duties incident to the receipt of federal 
money, the recipient has the option of withdrawing and hence 
terminating the prospective force of the injunction. 
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, supra, reiterated 
the Rosado approach: Remedies to enforce spending power 
statutes must respect the privilege of the recipient of federal 
funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt of federal money 
rather than .assume the further obligations and duties that a 
court has declared are necessary for compliance. 451 
U. S., at 29-30, 30, n. 23; id., at 53-55 (WHITE, J., dissenting 
in part). The Court noted that "in no [Spending Clause] 
case-have we required a state to provide money to plain-
tiffs, much less less required" a state to assume more burden-
some obligations. Id., at 29. 
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IV 
Since the private cause of action under Title VI is one im-
plied by the judiciary rather than expressly created bV"COn-
gres_§ , we s ou respec t e . oregomg cons1 erations appli-
caofe in Spending~ ause cases an a e care m e rung the 
limits o 1s cause o action and the remedies available there-
under. Because it was found that there was no proof of in-
tentional discrimination by respondents, I put aside for 
present purposes those situations involving a private plaintiff 
who is entitled to the benefits of a federal program but who 
has been intentionally discriminated against by the adminis-
trators of The program. In cases where intentional dis-
crimination has been shown, there can be no question as to 
what the recipient's obligation under the program was and no 
question that the recipient was aware of that obligation. In 
such situations, it may be that the victim of the intentional 
discrimination should· be entitled to a compensatory award, 
as well as to prospective relief in the event the state contin-
ues with the program. 20 
However that may be, the Court of Appeals in this case did 
not disturb the District Court's finding that there was no in-
tentional discrimination on racial grounds. The discrimina-
tion was unintentional and resulted from the disproportionate 
impact of the entry-level tests on racial minorities. In this 
20 It is not uncommon in the law for the extent of a defendant's liability to 
turn on the extent of his knowledge or culpability. Thus, it has been said 
that, under principles of contract law, a contracting party cannot be held 
liable for extraordinary harm due to special circumstances unless, at J{ time 
the contract was made, he knew or had reason to know the circumstances 
that made such extraordinary injury probable "so as to have the opportu-
nity of judging for himself as to the degree of this probability." 5 Corbin 
on Contracts § 1014 (1964). See also id. §§ 100&-1019; 11 W. Jaeger, 
Williston on Contracts§ 1344A (3d ed. 1968). And in tort law, usually only 
persons who have intentionally violated another's rights are liable for puni-
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and similar situations, it is not immediately obvious what the 
grantee's obligations under the federal program were and it 
is surely not obvious that the grantee was aware that it was 
administering the program in violation of the statute or regu-
lations. In such cases, proof of discriminatory impact does 
not end the matter. If the grantee can bear the burden of 
proving some "business necesity" for practices that have dis-
criminatory impact, it has a complete affirmative defense to 
claims of violation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, at 
431. Therefore, in the typical case where deliberate dis-
crimination on racial grounds is not shown, the recipient will 
have at least colorable defenses to charges of illegal dispar-
ate-impact discrimination, and it often will be the case that, 
prior to judgment, the grantee will not have known or have 
had compelling reason to know that it had been violating the 
federal standards. Hence, absent clear congressional intent 
or idance to the "Coiltrary, t'Iierelief in onvate actions 
should be limite to ec aratory and injunctive relief ordering 
future compiia'iieeWilh tne declared statutory and reglilatory 
obli~ditional relief in the form of money or other-
wise based on past unintentional violations should be 
withheld. 
The foregoing considerations control decision in this case. 
I note first that Title VI is spending-power legislation: 
"It is not a regulatory measure, but an exercise of the 
unquestioned power of the Federal Government to 'fix 
the terms on which Federal funds shall be disbursed.' 
Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127, 
143 (1947). No recipient is required to accept Federal 
aid. If he does so voluntarily, he must take it on the 
conditions on which it is offered." 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 
(1964) (Sen. Humphrey). 
Accord, id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. Celler)(validity of 
Title VI "rests on the power of Congress to fix the terms on 
which Federal funds will be made available"); id., at 6562 
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(Sen. Kuchel); id., at 7063 (Sen. Pastore). Title VI rests on I 
the principle that "taxpayers' money, which is collected with-
out discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination." 
I d., at 7064 (Sen. Ribicoff). Accord, id., at 7054-55, 7062 
(Sen. Pastore); id., at 7102 (Sen. Javits); id., at 6566 (memo-
randum by the Republican Members of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary). The mandate of Title VI is "[v]ery simple. 
Stop the discrimination, get the money; continue the dis-
crimination, do not get the money." !d., at 1542 (Rep. Lind-
say). Title VI imposes no obligations but simply "'extends 
an option' " that potential recipients are free to accept or re-
ject. Id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. Geller) (quoting 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480 (1923)). This 
legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended Title 
VI to be a typical "contractual" spending power provision. ~ 
Therefore, since Title VI is Spending Clause legislation, it 
is presumed that private litigants seeking to enforce compli-
ance with its terms are entitled to no more than the limited 
remedy deemed available to the plaintiffs in Pennhurst. 
The inquiry is not at this point complete, however, because, 
like all rules of statutory construction, the Pennhurst pre-
sumption must "yield ... to persuasive evidence of contrary 
legislative intent." Transamerica, supra, 444 U. S., at 20. 
As in Transamerica, the relevant legislative history reveals 
that "what evidence of intent exists in this case, circumstan-
tial though it may be, weighs against the implication of a pri-
vate right of action for a monetary award in a case such as 
this," ibid, at least absent proof of intentional discrimination. 
Title VI does not explicitly allow for any form of a private 
right of action. This fact did not go unnoticed by Senators 
Keating and Ribicoff, who unsuccessfully proposed an 
amendment adding to Title VI a provision expressly allowing 
the institution of "a civil action or other proper proceeding for 
preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, ... 
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by the person aggrieved." 109 Cong. Rec. 15375 (1963). 
Senator Keating explained that, under this proposal, if some-
one violated Title VI, funds could be denied or "a suit for spe-
cific performance of the nondiscrimination requirement could 
be brought . . . by the victim of the discrimination." I d., at 
15376. The relevant language of the proposed amendment is 
identical to that of § 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000a-3(a), the provision creating a private right 
of action to enforce Title II of the Act, which deals with dis-
crimination in public accommodations. Suits under § 204(a) 
are "private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action 
under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains 
an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority." Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 401-02 (1968). Senator Keating 
thought that elementary fairness required that victims of 
Title VI-proscribed discrimination be accorded the same pri-
vate right of action as allowed in the "proposed education and 
public accommodations titles of the [Civil Rights] bill." 21 
The Keating-Ribicoffproposal was not included in Title VI, 
but the important point for present purposes is that even the 
most ardent advocates of private enforcement of Title VI 
contemplated that private plaintiffs would only be awarded 
"preventive relief." Like the drafters of Title II, they did 
not intend to allow private plaintiffs to recover monetary 
21 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731 and 
S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 335 (1963) (Sen. Keating). JUSTICE 
MARSHALL incorrectly argues, post, at 6, that the Keating-Ribicoff pro-
posal was intented to "restrict available remedies." Quite the contrary, 
Sens. Keating and Ribicoff clearly intended to expand what they thought 
to be the available remedies; they feared that, without their amendment, 
no private relief at all would be available under Title VI. Hearings, 
supra, at 335 (Sen. Keating); 109 Cong. Rec. 15375 (1963) (Sen. Ribicoff) 
(Title VI "relies entirely on the punitive remedy of cutting off funds;" 
amendment needed to make Title VI "more effective and more humane"). 
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awards. Although the expressed intent of Senators Keating 
and Ribicoff is alone not determinative of whether a compen-
satory remedy may be obtained in a private action to enforce 
Title VI, "it is one more piece of evidence that Congress did 
not intend to authorize a cause of action for anything beyond 
limited equitable relief." Trans america Mortgage Advisors, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 22. Surely, it did not intend to 
do so where intentional discrimination is not shown. 
The remaining indications of congressional intent are also 
circumstantial, but they all militate in favor of the conclusion 
that only prospective relief ordering compliance withg the 
terms of the grant is appropriate as a private remedy for 
Title VI violations in cases such as this. The "greatest possi-
ble emphasis" was given to the fact that the "real objective" 
of Title VI was "the elimination of discrimination in the use 
and receipt of Federal funds." 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) 
(Sen. Humphrey). See also id., at 7062 (Sen. Pastore). The 
remedy of termination of assistance was regarded as "a last 
resort, to be used only if all else fails," because "cutoffs of 
Federal funds would defeat important objectives of Federal 
legislation, without commensurate gains in eliminating racial 
discrimination or segregation." I d., at 6544, 6546 (Senator 
Humphrey). 22 
To ensure that this intent would be respected, Congress in- ~ 
eluded an explicit provision in § 602 of Title VI that requires 
that any administrative enforcement action be "consistent 
with the achievement of the objective of the statute authoriz-
ing the financial assistance in connection with which the ac-
tion is taken." 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l. Although an award 
of damages would not be as drastic a remedy as a cutoff of 
funds, the possibility of large monetary liability for unin-
tended discrimination might well dissuade potential 
nondiscriminating recipients from participating in federal 
22 See also, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1520 (1964) (Rep. Celler); id, at 7063 
(Sen. Pastore); id., at 7075 (Sen. Ribicoff). 
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programs, thereby hindering the objectives of the funding 
statutes. See 633 F. 2d, at 261-262 (opinion of Meskill, J.). 
In summary, then, there is no legislative history that in 
any way rebuts the Pennhurst presumption that only limited 
injunctive relief should be granted as a remedy for unin-
tended violations of statutes passed pursuant to the spending 
power. Quite the contrary, what little evidence there is 'I 
evinces an intent not to allow any greater relief. 23 Yf{ con- ~ 
23 The lower courts are generally in agreement that it is not appropriate 
to award monetary damages for Title VI violations. See Lieberman v. 
University of Chicago, 660 F. 2d 1185 (CA7 1981) (Title IX case), cert. de-
nied, -- U. S. -- (1982); Drayden v. Needville Independent School 
District, 642 F. 2d 129, 133 (CA5 1981); Nabke v. HUD, 520 F. Supp. 5, 
10-11 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails 
Apartments, 496 F . Supp. 522, 526--527 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Rendon v. Utah 
State Dept. of Employment Security Job Service, 454 F. Supp. 534 (D. 
Utah 1978). See also C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts§ 317 (1980); 2 
N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B. Neuborne & S. Law, Political and Civil Rights in 
the United States 608 (4th ed. 1979). But cf. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 
2d 969, 977-979 (CA8 1982) (holding that damages may be recovered under 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was considered to be "closely 
analogous" to Title VI); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842 (D. 
Neb.)(dicta), aff'd without mention of remedies, 524 F. 2d 1013 (CA81975); 
Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 FEP Cas. 1138 (C.D. Ca. 1978)(dicta); 
Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 
377 (D. D.C. 1976)(dicta). 
My rationale is not, as JUSTICE STEVENS asserts, post, at 2, n. 2, con-
trary to the "square holdings" of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U. S. 677 (1977). In Cannon, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to maintain a private cause of action under Title IX. The case was re-
manded for trial without a word of discussion as to the relief to which the 
plaintiff would be entitled in the event she prevailed. In Bakke, five 
Members of the Court voted to affirm a judgment directing a Title VI 
plaintiff to be admitted to a medical school, but this only ordered the state 
to comply with Title VI. There was no monetary award or otlier relief 
base d on a past v1oiation of the Act. In addition, one of the five Justices 
who voted to affirm this judgment only assumed for the purposes of the 
case that any private remedy at all was available under Title VI. 438 
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elude that compensatory relief, or other relief based on past 
violations of the conditions attached use of federal funds, is 
not available as a private remedy for Title VI violations not 
involving intentional discrimination. 24 
U.S., at ~284 (POWELL, J.). It therefore follows a fortiori that this 
Justice expressed no conclusive opinion on the availability of any particular 
form of private relief. 
JusTICE STEVENS also argues, post, at 4--5, that even if Title VI autho-
rizes only a limited remedy, full relief is available in this case because the 
petitioners "sought relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983," and § 1983 "provides a 
damages remedy." Damages indeed are usually available in a § 1983 ac-
tion, but such is not the case when the plaintiff alleges only a deprivation of 
rights secured by a Spending Clause statute. Thus, in Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27-29 (1981), the Court indicated that, 
even if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief uner § 1983 for defendants' al-
leged violations of certain Spending Clause legislation, the defendants 
would not be required "to provide money to [the] plaintiffs." 
24 JUSTICE MARSHALL erroneously contends, post, at 10, that my view 
"would allow recipients to violate the conditions of their contracts with im-
punity until a court identifies the violation and either enjoins its continu-
ance or orders the recipient to begin performing its duties incident to the 
receipt of federal money." This is not so, because the Federal Govern-
ment can always sue any recipient that fails to comply with the terms of 
the grant agreement and force the violator to repay misspent funds. See 
Bell v. New Jersey,-- U. S. --, -- (1983) (WHITE, J., concurring). 
But it is an entirely different matter to subject the recipient to open-ended 
liability to private plaintiffs. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S third-party benefi-
ciary analogy is appealing, but he simply ignores the possibility that Con-
gress may have felt that the salutary deterrent effect of a compensatory 
remedy was outweighed by the possibility that such a remedy might dis-
suade potential recipients from participating in important federal pro-
grams. Of course, not every contract that benefits third persons accords 
enforceable rights in such persons; it is a question of intent. See 4 Corbin 
on Contracts § 777 (1964). Section 313 of the Restatement (2d) of Con-
tracts (1981) states that a party who contracts with a government agency 
to do an act or render a service to the public is generally not subject to 
contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages 
resulting from performance or failure to perform. The only exceptions to 
this rule involve situations where the terms of the contract provide for such 
liability, or where the governmental entity would be subject to liability to 
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v 
If the relief unavailable under Title VII and ordered under 
Title VI is the kind of relief that should be withheld in enforc-
ing a Spending Clause statute, the Court should affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals without more. Only if all 
or some of this relief is the kind of declaratory or prospective 
relief that private enforcement of Title VI properly contem-
plates should the Court of Appeals be reversed in whole or in 
part. To resolve this matter, I now consider the items of re-
lief ordered by the District Court to determine if any element 
is a permissible in'u ctive remedy. 
ough t e Eleventh Amendment cases are not dispos-
itive here, in holding that only prospective relief is available 
to remedy violations of federal law by state officials, the 
Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667 (1974), ob-
served that the difference between permissible and imper-
missible relief "will not in many instances be that between 
night and day." It seems as patent here as in the Eleventh 
Amendment context that the relief cannot include a monetary 
award for past wrongs, even if the award is in the form of 
"equitable restitution" instead of damages. See id., at 
665-67. However, prospective relief need not be "totally 
without effect on the [defendant's] revenues;" injunctive re-
lief is permissible even if it means that the defendants, in 
order to shape their conduct to the mandate of the court's de-
cree, will have to spend more money "than if they had been 
left free to pursue their previous course of conduct." I d., at 
667-68. The key question for present purposes is whether 
the decree requires the payment of funds or grants other re-
lief, "not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the fu-
ture with a substantive federal question determination, but 
as a form of compensation" or other relief based on or flowing 
the injured member of the public. Neither of these exceptions is appli- l 
cable in the present context. 
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from violations at a prior time when the defendant "was 
under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different 
standard." I d., at 668. 
The District Court in the present case granted a number of 
relatively discrete items of relief. First, each class member 
was awarded constructive seniority, which included the right 
to: 1) "all monetary entitlements which [the class members] 
would have received had they been appointed on their con-
structive seniority date," including backpay and back medical 
and insurance benefits; and 2) all other entitlements relative 
to the award of constructive seniority, including salary, bene-
fits, and pension rights. Also, respondents were directed to 
give a sergeant's examination to those class members whose 
constructive seniority would have entitled them to take the 
last such examination. Finally, in an effort to insure that fu-
ture hiring practices would be nondiscriminatory, respond-
ents were ordered to consult with petitioners on the prepara-
tion and use of future police officer examinations for the next 
two years, and to provide petitioners with race and ethnicity 
information regarding the scores of the next scheduled 
examination. App. 99-107.25 
On the one hand, it is obvious that the award of back pay 
and back benefits constitutes relief based upon past conduct 
no longer permissible; it therefore should not stand. On the 
other hand, it is without doubt that the portion of the order 
requiring consultation to insure that future examinations will 
not have discriminatory effects constitutes permissible in-
junctive relief aimed at conforming respondent's future con-
duct to the declared law. 
This leaves the award of constructive seniority for pur-
poses of future entitlements: the right to take the special ser-
geant's exam ordered by the District Court and the right to 
an increase of salary and benefits to the level warranted by 
25 As permitted by 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the 
District Court also awarded attorney's fees to petitioners. App. 107. 
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the constructive seniority. Because such an award affects 
only the future conduct of a defendant, it arguably could be 
categorized as permissible prospective relief. ~conclude, J, 
however, that an award of constructive seniQ!"ity, for any 
purpose whatsoever, musn>e aeemed impermissible retroac-
tive relief. 
m Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 
766--67 (1976), we identified two types of seniority-"benefit" 
and "competitive status." The first of these, "which deter-
mines pension rights, length of vacations, size of insurance 
coverage and unemployment benefits, and the like, is analo-
gous to backpay. . . . Benefit-type seniority, like backpay, 
serves to work complete ~ng the wrongdoer 
econom1ca y at e same time t at it ten s to whole the 
one w o was wronged." Id., at 786-87 POWELL .). Its 
c~ "reduces the restitutiOn required of an 
employer at such time as he is called upon to account for his 
discriminatory actions perpetrated in violation of the law." 
Id., at 767 n.27 (opinion of the Court). Since constructive 
benefit-type seniority in this case is obviously restitutionary 
and remedial in nature, it is "a form of compensation" to 
those whose rights were violated at a time when the respond-
ents were "under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a 
different standard." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 668. 
It is therefore not an appropriate remedy for the Title VI vi-
olations alleged here. 
An award of "competitive status" seniority, although 
purely prospective in form, nevertheless constitutes a form of 
compensation or relief based on past conduct now deemed vi-
olative of the Act. In no respect can such an award be said 
to be "a necessary consequence," Edelman, 415 U. S., at 
668, of future Title VI compliance by the employer. It 
therefore must also be considered an inappropriate ]'itk VI 
r~medy. I also note that competitive-type seruorifyttdeter-
mmes an employee's preferential rights to various economic 
advantages at the expense of other employees. These nor-
81-431-0PINION 
GUARDIAN ASSN. v. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N N. Y. C. 25 
mally include the order of layoff and recall of employees, job 
and trip assignments, and consideration for promotion." 
Franks, supra, at 787 (POWELL, J.). Although an award of 
constructive seniority of this nature does not result in any in-
creased costs to the wrongdoing employer, it "directly impli-
cate[s] the rights and expectations of perfectly innocent em-
ployees," id., at 788, and it can only be viewed as 
compensation for a past wrong. Accordingly, I conclude 
that neither an award of "benefit" nor "competitive status" 
constructive seniority may be obtained as a private remedy 
for Title VI violations, at least in the absence of proof of in-
tentional discrimination. 
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent to me that the only 
proper Title VI relief granted by the District Court is the 
order directing the respondents to take actions and make dis-
closures intended to insure that future hiring practices will 
be nondiscriminatory and valid. However, this relief is 
wholly sustainable under the District Court's findings and 
conclusions with respect to petitioners' Title VII claim, and 
all members of the class will fully benefit from it. 26 There is 
thus no need to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
VI 
In conclusion, for the reasons expressed above, I am con-
vinced that discriminatory intent is not an essential element 
of a Title VI violation, but that a private plaintiff should re-
cover only injunctive, noncompensatory relief for a defend-
ant's unintentional violations of Title VI. Such relief should 
not include an award of constructive seniority. Albeit on dif-
ferent grounds, the judgment below is 
Affirmed. 
26 Under Title VII, this type of relief can be granted unconditionally. 
Under Title VI, the defendants would have to be given the option of com-
plying or terminating participation in the federal program. See parts IV 
& V, supra. 
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